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ABSTRACT 
 In 2017, after three years of investment, the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) restarted an IT acquisition project focused on the U.S. Coast Guard’s (USCG) and 
Transportation Security Administration’s financial system. Such projects bear inherent 
risks in terms of their size and interoperability and affect a wide range of agencies’ 
operational missions. This thesis conducts a comparative analysis of the DHS’s financial 
system failure and examines whether this project failure shares characteristics and 
challenges with other large government IT projects. It analyzes the causes, risks, and 
ways to mitigate IT failures through four case studies of large government IT projects 
that failed: DHS’s financial system, the USCG electronic health care system, the 
HealthCare.gov website, and the FBI virtual case file program. It finds that these IT 
projects share common challenges, including significant schedule delays and cost 
increases, which inevitably led them to fail. The four case studies reveal a few important 
elements that contribute to successful government IT projects: defining the project 
outcomes at the beginning, having the right expertise, leading the organization through 
business process change, and fostering internal control procedures. These findings are 
representative of a small sample size; they only cover recent IT projects in the U.S. 
Future research can focus on the lessons learned from the failures to benefit both public 
and private IT development projects. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Since the creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in 2002, its 
components’ financial systems have been operating under legacy policies and disparate 
business processes because of outdated technology. As a result, these systems have been 
mostly non-integrated or non-interoperable with one another, and many components still 
rely on manual processes, which have led to inconsistent data and reporting. The United 
States Coast Guard (USCG) has been the financial service provider for three DHS 
components: USCG, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), and the 
Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office (CWMD). These three components—
DHS TRIO—exemplify the challenges posed by obsolete financial systems. A new 
financial management system is therefore needed to fully support Coast Guard financial 
and acquisition needs and comply with DHS and security requirements. Specifically, the 
Core Accounting System (CAS)1 had significant problems such as internal control 
weaknesses and an inability to produce accurate, reliable, and timely financial information 
and reports. Likewise, CAS lacked integration with feeder systems such as the Treasury 
Department, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and other USCG inventory 
and acquisition systems. It thus failed to meet some but not all requirements of the 
acquisition and financial management community of the USCG. Under these 
circumstances, the USCG needed to modernize its CAS. This thesis investigates how the 
USCG can achieve this goal. 
The research for this thesis sought to answer the following questions. What can the 
USCG do to meet the cost and schedule, but more importantly, to increase the likelihood 
of procuring a system that will meet its financial and operational needs or acquire the value 
that the agency has paid for? What are the program management processes that USCG 
needs to develop to make sure the transition to the new financial system can go smoothly?  
 
1 CAS is the current financial management system for USCG, as well as for the Transportation 
Security Administration (TSA) and Domestic Nuclear Detection Office which became the Countering 
Weapons of Mass Destruction office (CWMD) in 2017. It is a highly customized version of Oracle Federal 
Financials Release ® 11.5.10. 
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This thesis first includes a comparative analysis of DHS and the USCG’s Financial 
System failure to determine whether this project failure is unique or shares characteristics 
and challenges with other large government IT projects. Toward this end, the first part of 
this thesis reviews the lessons learned from DHS TRIO components—USCG, TSA, and 
CWMD—with the Department of the Interior–Interior Business Center (DOI-IBC) and 
compares them with other government failures in IT acquisition projects such as 
HealthCare.gov; the USCG Integrated Health Information System (IHiS); and the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) virtual case file (VCF). These IT projects share common 
challenges with the USCG financial system for their relatively large government 
acquisition programs. Such projects bear inherent risks in terms of their size, 
interoperability, and integration with different government systems’ requirements. 
Research for this thesis reviewed and identified the similarities that contributed to these 
large IT acquisition failures. Second, based on the findings of the comparative analysis, 
this thesis provides recommendations related to both project management and business 
processes that DHS should apply to successfully transition the USCG and TSA to the new 
financial management system and the rest of their financial management modernization.  
Research for this thesis examined the scholarly debates on the failure of 
government IT projects. Specifically, it analyzed the scholarly views on causes, risks, and 
ways to mitigate IT failures. To this end, it reviewed a variety of academic peer-reviewed 
papers from the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), Journal of 
Scientific Research, Science Direct, studies from the Standish Group, Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) reports, government agencies acquisition life cycle processes 
and procedures, and articles from Computerworld and Govtech. 
This research found that large government IT projects are often categorized as high 
risk and likely to fail. They are complex and take longer than two years to develop. 
Government IT projects are usually built to connect to multiple agencies. These 
government IT projects affect a wide range of agencies’ operational missions and the 
different type of services that these agencies provide to the public. The four government 
IT projects this thesis analyzed—DHS TRIO, USCG IHiS, HealthCare.gov, and FBI 
xvii 
VCF—are categorized as large projects.2 The challenges revealed in the case studies in 
this thesis are not unique. The initial failures and challenges of the case studies are not 
isolated cases, and these issues have affected other government projects as well. The case 
studies and lessons learned in this thesis may contribute to more effective practices that 
can be used in future big government IT projects.  
The four case studies all experienced schedule delays and cost increases. The DHS 
TRIO and HealthCare.gov projects required significant rework while IHiS and FBI VCF 
were cancelled and restarted as new projects. The DHS TRIO project costs increased by 
54 percent from the original estimate and delayed the delivery schedule by more than two 
years.3 The USCG IHiS spent over $56 million; after five years it was cancelled and 
restarted as a completely new project named DOD MHS GENESIS.4 The HealthCare.gov 
cost increased from the original estimate of $292 million to $2.1 billion.5 The FBI had 
wasted $105 million by the time the VCF project was cancelled and restarted as a new 
project in 2005.6 
The four large government IT projects, DHS TRIO, USCG IHiS, the 
HealthCare.gov, and FBI VCF, shared similar results. They all experienced significant 
schedule delays and cost increases, which inevitably led them to fail. The major factors 
that contributed to the four projects’ failures were 1) not defining the project outcomes at 
 
2 The Standish Group, CHAOS Report: 21st Anniversary Edition (West Yarmouth, MA: The Standish 
Group International, Inc., 2014), https://www.standishgroup.com/sample_research_files/
CHAOSReport2014.pdf. According to the 2014 Standish report, large IT projects have budgets over $10 
million and take over two years to develop, which was the case of all four case studies.  
3 Asif A. Khan, DHS Financial Management: Improved Use of Best Practices Could Help Manage 
System Modernization Project Risks, GAO-17-803T (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 
2017), https://www.gao.gov/assets/690/687359.pdf. 
4 David A. Powner, Coast Guard Health Records: Timely Acquisition of New System Is Critical to 
Overcoming Challenges with Paper Process, GAO-18-59 (Washington, DC: Government Accountability 
Office, 2018), https://www.gao.gov/assets/690/689565.pdf; “MHS GENESIS,” Military Health System, 
accessed April 9, 2021, https://www.health.mil/Military-Health-Topics/Technology/Federal-Electronic-
Health-Record-Modernization/MHS-GENESIS. 
5 Alex Wayne, “Obamacare website Costs Exceed $2 Billion, Study Finds,” Bloomberg, September 
24, 2014, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-09-24/obamacare-website-costs-exceed-2-
billion-study-finds. 
6 Harry Goldstein, “Who Killed the Virtual Case File? [Case Management Software],” IEEE Spectrum 
42, no. 9 (September 2005): 24–35, https://doi.org/10.1109/MSPEC.2005.1502526. 
xviii 
the beginning of the Acquisition Life cycle, 2) lacking the right expertise, and 3) having 
weaknesses in leadership throughout the business process change and the internal control 
procedures. The projects’ challenges and shortcomings led to lessons learned in these four 
areas for future government and private sector large IT projects.  
The four case studies that this thesis reviewed revealed a few important elements 
that contribute to successful projects, especially government IT projects: defining the 
project outcomes at the beginning, having the right expertise, leading the organization 
through the business process change, and fostering internal control procedures. 
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I. INTRODUCTION: DHS FINANCIAL SYSTEM 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Since the creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in 2002, its 
components’ financial systems have been operating under legacy policies and disparate 
business processes because of outdated technology. As a result, these systems have been 
mostly non-integrated or non-interoperable with one another, and many components still 
rely on manual processes, which have led to inconsistent data and reporting. The United 
States Coast Guard (USCG) has been the financial service provider for three DHS 
components: USCG, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), and the 
Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office (CWMD). These three components—
DHS TRIO—exemplify the challenges posed by obsolete financial systems. A new 
financial management system (FMS) is therefore needed to fully support Coast Guard 
financial and acquisition needs and comply with DHS and security requirements. 
Specifically, the Core Accounting System (CAS)1 has significant problems such as internal 
control weaknesses and an inability to produce accurate, reliable, and timely financial 
information and reports. Likewise, CAS lacks integration with feeder systems such as the 
Treasury Department, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and other USCG 
inventory and acquisition systems. It thus fails to meet some but not all requirements of the 
acquisition and financial management community of the USCG. Under these 
circumstances, the USCG needs to modernize its CAS. This thesis investigates how the 
USCG can achieve this goal. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
What can the United States Coast Guard do to meet the cost and schedule, but more 
importantly, to increase the likelihood of procuring a system that will meet its financial and 
operational needs or acquire the value that the agency has paid for? What are the program 
 
1 CAS is the current financial management system for USCG, as well as for the Transportation 
Security Administration (TSA) and Domestic Nuclear Detection Office which became the Countering 
Weapons of Mass Destruction office (CWMD) in 2017. It is a highly customized version of Oracle Federal 
Financials Release ® 11.5.10. 
2 
management processes that USCG needs to develop to make sure the transition to the new 
financial system can go smoothly?  
In order to answer the main research questions, this thesis also answers these three 
sub-questions: 
1. What are the key characteristics of a large IT investment in government?  
2. Why do government IT projects fail?  
3. What are some of the risks associated with cost, schedule, and 
performance in IT acquisition projects?  
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This literature review examines the scholarly debates on the failure of government 
IT projects. Specifically, it analyzes scholarly views on causes, risks, and ways to mitigate 
IT failures. To this end, it reviews a variety of academic peer-reviewed papers from the 
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), Journal of Scientific Research, 
Science Direct, studies from the Standish Group, Government Accountability Office 
(GAO) reports, and articles from Computerworld and Govtech.  
A corpus of literature provides insights into the reasons for risks and effects of high 
failure rates of IT projects. Payne and Anthopoulus et al., for instance, argue that large 
governmental IT projects seem to fail worldwide because they are complex.2 Estevez and 
Joseph, who cite Gauld, Godfinch, Heeks and Scholl have in their article, have all studied 
government project failures for many years, agreed with Payne and Anthopoulus et al.3 
Similarly, Gil-García and Pardo found that many government IT projects fail because of 
 
2 Adam Payne, “80% of Major Government Projects Are at ‘Risk of Failure’ as Civil Servants 
Struggle to Cope with Brexit,” Business Insider, January 25, 2018, https://www.businessinsider.com/ifg-
report-major-government-projects-at-risk-of-failure-brexit-2018-1; Leonidas Anthopoulos et al., “Why E-
Government Projects Fail? An Analysis of the Healthcare.Gov website,” Government Information 
Quarterly 33, no. 1 (January 2016): 162, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.giq.2015.07.003. 
3 José Esteves and Rhoda C. Joseph, “A Comprehensive Framework for the Assessment of 
EGovernment Projects,” Government Information Quarterly 25, no. 1 (January 2008): 118–32, 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.giq.2007.04.009. 
3 
their complexity and relatively large scale.4 They also noted that large projects tend to 
carry high risk. Furthermore, Yaraghi explained that big government IT projects usually 
fail not because of inadequate project management but because contractors lack the means 
or resources to assume that risk, and therefore the government must bear it.5 Sometimes, 
as the projects are quite large, both government and contractors fail to accurately estimate 
project complexity. Likewise, government agencies and contractors set unrealistic 
expectations for one another that emerge while they are building the system.  
Along these lines, the Defense Acquisition Performance Assessment report in 2006 
summed up the DOD’s failure to estimate the technical complexity and risks of projects, 
leading to project failure, excessive costs, and delayed completion.6 The next group of 
scholars agreed and dove deeper into the root causes of the failure. For example, Fairley 
and Willshire, as well as Imamoglou and Gozlu, went further and argued that the leading 
causes of IT project failures are unclearly defined requirements, poor project management, 
and lack of communication and stakeholder engagement.7 Several scholars, including 
Nielsen and Pedersen, as well as Sarantis, Charalabidis and Askounis, agreed with these 
assessments and further stressed that project management and stakeholder engagement 
 
4 J. Ramón Gil-García and Theresa A. Pardo, “E-Government Success Factors: Mapping Practical 
Tools to Theoretical Foundations,” Government Information Quarterly 22, no. 2 (2005): 187–216, 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.giq.2005.02.001. 
5 Niam Yaraghi, “Doomed: Challenges and Solutions to Government IT Projects,” TechTank (blog), 
August 25, 2015, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2015/08/25/doomed-challenges-and-solutions-
to-government-it-projects/. 
6 Ronald Kadish et al., Defense Acquisition Performance Assessment Report (Washington, DC: 
Assessment Panel of the Defense Acquisition Performance Assessment Project, 2006), https://apps.dtic.mil/
dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a459941.pdf. 
7 Richard E. Fairley and Mary Jane Willshire, “Why the Vasa Sank: 10 Problems and Some Antidotes 
for Software Projects,” IEEE Software 20, no. 2 (March 2003): 18–25, https://doi.org/10.1109/
MS.2003.1184161; Oksan Imamoglu and Sitki Gozlu, “The Sources of Success and Failure of Information 
Technology Projects: Project Managers’ Perspective,” in Technology Management for a Sustainable 
Economy, ed. Dundar F. Kocaoglu, Timothy R. Anderson, and Tugrul U. Daim (PICMET ‘08 - 2008 
Portland International Conference on Management of Engineering Technology, Portland OR: IEEE, 2008), 
1430–35, https://doi.org/10.1109/PICMET.2008.4599756. 
4 
were crucial to the successful execution of a project.8 Overall, these authors agreed on the 
importance of setting well-defined requirements to prevent unforeseen complications of 
the projects later. They highlighted the importance of communication and the involvement 
of end users or stakeholders. Involving end users or stakeholders can ensure the end product 
achieves the required process, meets stakeholders’ expectations, and makes a positive 
difference to the end users.  
John Marinaro and Benoit Hardy-Vallée also note that IT project failures present 
high financial and non-financial costs to taxpayers.9 Indeed, as the OMB notes, in 2019, 
the United States government spent $83.4 billion on major and non-major IT investment. 
On the government’s online IT dashboard, the federal government posts all IT investment 
projects and the agencies’ Chief Information Officers (CIO) rate risk in their agencies’ IT 
projects based on the criteria set up by the federal government. According to these risk 
assessments, federal leaders considered 54.2 percent of IT investments to be of medium to 
high risk before they began.10 John Marinaro, Vice President of Key Logic, further 
explains that the assessed high risk reflected the fact that nearly half of all federal employee 
project managers miss the target by either overspending or failing to fully deliver all the 
requirements of the projects completed.11 Government has spent a lot of money to improve 
the IT infrastructure and strengthen government service programs. However, it has been 
challenging for government to manage IT programs efficiently and effectively. Many of 
the projects are too big and high-risk to begin with.  
8 Jeppe Agger Nielsen and Keld Pedersen, “IT Portfolio Decision-Making in Local Governments: 
Rationality, Politics, Intuition and Coincidences,” Government Information Quarterly 31, no. 3 (July 2014): 
411–20, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.giq.2014.04.002; Demetrios Sarantis, Yannis Charalabidis, and Dimitris 
Askounis, “A Goal-Driven Management Framework for Electronic Government Transformation Projects 
Implementation,” Government Information Quarterly 28, no. 1 (January 2011): 117–28, https://doi.org/
10.1016/j.giq.2009.10.006. 
9 John Marinaro, “Why Federal IT Projects Fail (and How to Ensure Success),” Nextgov, March 11, 
2019, https://www.nextgov.com/ideas/2019/03/why-federal-it-projects-fail-and-how-ensure-success/
155435/; Benoit Hardy-Vallée, “The Cost of Bad Project Management,” Business Journal, February 7, 
2012, https://news.gallup.com/businessjournal/152429/cost-bad-project-management.aspx? 
10 Office of Management and Budget, “Our Information Technology Investments at Work,” IT 
Dashboard.gov, Accessed August 29, 2021, https://myit-2019.itdashboard.gov/. 
11 Marinaro, “Why Federal IT Projects Fail.” 
5 
The Standish Group has studied IT projects’ successes and failures both in the 
United States and internationally for many years. It agrees with the OMB that large IT 
projects are high-risk for both government and private sectors.12 The Standish Group 
tracked more than 25,000 software development projects in its database from 2003 to 2012 
for both government and private sectors that had labor costs of at least $10 million: only 8 
percent were successful. As this report noted, 51 percent of the large projects were 
“challenged,” meaning they were over budget, behind schedule, or did not meet the user 
expectation and the rest of the 41.4 percent were failures. McFarlan’s 1981 article 
“Portfolio Approach to Information Systems” aligns with the Standish Group reports, 
explaining that there is correlation between larger project size and higher risk in term of 
failing to meet the anticipated values and staying on budget and schedule. In addition, past 
Standish Group reports—from 1995, 2001, and 2004—argue that the failed projects were 
either terminated prior to completion or failed to fulfill the anticipated benefits.13 As a 
result, some were morphed into new projects, which would start from scratch. 
Similarly, the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) case management software 
system, called virtual case file (VCF), utterly failed. The FBI terminated the virtual case 
initiative after spending about $170 million over four years, starting in 2001, and enduring 
much scrutiny from Congress and frustration within the agency.14 By the end of 2004, the 
FBI concluded that the virtual case initiatives were not going to work.15 Goldstein 
explained that the virtual case project was a system, developed by Science Applications 
 
12 The Standish Group, CHAOS Report: 21st Anniversary Edition (West Yarmouth, MA: The 
Standish Group International, Inc., 2014), https://www.standishgroup.com/sample_research_files/
CHAOSReport2014.pdf. 
13 F. Warren McFarlan, “Portfolio Approach to Information Systems,” Harvard Business Review 59, 
no. 5 (September 1981): 142–50; The Standish Group, CHAOS Report 1995 (West Yarmouth, MA: The 
Standish Group International, Inc., 1994), https://www.researchgate.net/publication/263849222; The 
Standish Group, Extreme CHAOS (West Yarmouth, MA: The Standish Group International, Inc., 2001), 
https://courses.cs.ut.ee/MTAT.03.243/2013_spring/uploads/Main/standish.pdf; and The Standish Group, 
CHAOS Report 2004 (West Yarmouth, MA: The Standish Group International, Inc., 2003), 
http://blog.nalis.fr/public/pdf/q3-spotlight.pdf. 
14 Harry Goldstein, “Who Killed the Virtual Case File? [Case Management Software],” IEEE 
Spectrum 42, no. 9 (September 2005): 24–35, https://doi.org/10.1109/MSPEC.2005.1502526. 
15 Jerome Israel, “Why the FBI Can’t Build a Case Management System,” Computer 45, no. 6 (June 
2012): 73–80, https://doi.org/10.1109/MC.2012.2. 
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International Corp (SAIC) and the FBI for tracking criminal cases, and further noted that a 
new project, Sentinel, a $425 million project, replaced the project.16 Thus, the FBI wasted 
the funding and efforts invested in the VCF project.  
Scholars note that these types of project failures happen in other countries as well. 
For example, Lohrmann pointed out in 2013 that the National Health Service in the United 
Kingdom abandoned its massive patient record computer system because the result fell 
short; the system cost over $16 billion and, if continued, would have cost hundreds of 
millions of dollars more.17 The Office of the Auditor General of Canada did an audit on a 
Canadian IT investment project called the Phoenix pay system. The project, implemented 
in 2009, was designed to improve the government payroll system to accommodate 
transactions of up to $22 billion. Instead, the Office of the Auditor General concluded that 
the Phoenix project failed to meet users’ requirements and fixing it would cost the 
Canadian government millions of tax dollars.18 In short, large government IT projects, 
whether in the United States or abroad, come with high risks and have a longstanding 
history of failing to be completed on time, on budget, and meeting project objectives.  
To sum up, many of the scholars and reports above agreed that government IT 
projects tend to fail or carry a high risk of failure. Many lessons can be learned and 
improvements can be drawn from these studies. 
D. RESEARCH DESIGN 
To answer the research question, this thesis includes a comparative analysis of the 
U.S. Coast Guard’s Financial System failure to examine whether this project failure is 
unique or shares characteristics and challenges with other large government IT projects. 
Toward this end, the first part of this thesis reviews the lessons learned from DHS TRIO 
 
16 Goldstein, “Who Killed the Virtual Case File?” 
17 Dan Lohrmann, “Why Do Many Big IT Projects Fail in Government?,” Lohrmann on Cybersecurity 
(blog), November 3, 2013, https://www.govtech.com/blogs/lohrmann-on-cybersecurity/Why-do-many-big-
IT-projects-fail-in-government.html. 
18 Office of the Auditor General of Canada, Report 1—Building and Implementing the Phoenix Pay 
System (Ottawa, Ontario: Reports of the Auditor General of Canada, May 29, 2018), http://www.oag-
bvg.gc.ca/internet/English/att__e_43045.html. 
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components—USCG, TSA, CWMD—with the Department of the Interior-Interior 
Business Center (DOI-IBC) and compares them with other government failures in IT 
acquisition projects such HealthCare.gov, the electronic health care system, and the FBI 
VCF. These IT projects share common challenges with the U.S. Coast Guard financial 
system as they are relatively large government acquisition programs. Such projects bear 
inherent risk in terms of their size, interoperability, and integration with different 
government systems’ requirements. Research for this thesis reviewed and identified the 
similarities that contributed to these large IT acquisition failures. Second, based on the 
findings of the comparative analysis, this thesis provides recommendations related to both 
project management and business processes that DHS should apply to successfully 
transition the USCG and TSA to the new financial management system and the rest of their 
financial management modernization.  
E. THESIS OVERVIEW 
Chapter II presents the case studies of DHS TRIO Financial Management 
Modernization project. Chapters III, IV, and V review other unsuccessful acquisition 
projects such as the USCG Integrated Health Information System (IHiS), HealthCare.gov, 
and the FBI virtual case management project. Chapter VI presents the findings from the 
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II. EVALUATING THE DHS TRIO PROJECT 
In 2016, more than two years into the agreement between DHS and DOI-IBC, many 
issues arose related to costs, technical requirements, and schedule. GAO conducted a 
review on the DHS Financial Management TRIO acquisition project that revealed many 
problems with the program’s cost and delivery schedule. For example, the estimated cost 
for the TRIO project increased by 54 percent from the original estimate because of an 
increase in project requirements, lack of expertise, lack of leadership, and failure in 
business process change.19 As noted in the hearing before the subcommittee on oversight 
and management efficiency, DOI-IBC could not fully meet the technical requirements of 
TRIO. In addition, DOI-IBC struggled to grasp the complexity of the TRIO project; DOI-
IBC had never provided financial services to a large agency like DHS.20 DHS realized that 
DOI-IBC would not be able to deliver the financial systems originally intended for the TSA 
and USCG. In February 2017, DHS notified the congressional Committee on Homeland 
Security that the TRIO financial management system modernization project with DOI-IBC 
had generated cost overruns and breached the delivery schedule.21 After more than three 
years of partnership and configuration efforts, DHS cancelled the contract with DOI-IBC 
in May 2017.  
This chapter first gives background on a key element of acquisition programs, the 
analysis of alternatives (AoA). TRIO’s implementation of the AoA was one of its key 
weaknesses in the execution of the acquisition, which is described in detail in the project 
requirements and scope section. The review also focuses on whether the TRIO project had 
 
19 Asif A. Khan, DHS Financial Management: Improved Use of Best Practices Could Help Manage 
System Modernization Project Risks, GAO-17-803T (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 
2017), https://www.gao.gov/assets/690/687359.pdf, 8. 
20 DHS Financial Systems: Will Modernization Ever Be Achieved? Hearing Before the Subcommittee 
on Oversight and Management Efficiency, Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives, 
115th Cong. 1 (2017), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-115hhrg28418/pdf/CHRG-
115hhrg28418.pdf. 
21 Charles D. Michel, ADM, “Financial Management Service Improvement Initiative (FMSII) 
Program Breach Notification” (official memorandum, Washington, DC: United States Coast Guard, 2017). 
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the right leadership and expertise for the project and how well leadership managed the 
business changes.  
A. ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVES
The DHS Acquisition Life cycle framework includes four major acquisition phases
(Figure 1): 
1. Need: identifies the need or operational gaps and the need for a system
that would fulfill operational mission;
2. Analyze/Select: analyzes alternative solutions to reach a decision on the
optimal solution (material and/or non-material) that will address the
problem;
3. Obtain: develops or obtains a chosen material solution;
4. Produce Deploy Support: produces, deploys, and supports the solution in
its operational environment and disposes of the system at the end of its life
cycle.
11 
Figure 1. DHS Acquisition Life Cycle.22 
The AoA is conducted early in the acquisition process to identify trade-offs 
between alternatives to come up with the best solution; it spans from the Need phase to the 
Analyze/Select phase in the DHS Acquisition Life cycle. The main objectives of a typical 
AoA are to document a needed system and concept of operations, define the metrics, and 
identify alternative products or services. An AoA is designed to meet the project’s needs, 
analyze cost, and evaluate risks, performance, operational effectiveness and trade-offs 
among cost and needed capabilities. Figure 2 shows the major steps of analysis in the AoA 
process.  
22 Bryant Streett, Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) Methodologies: Considerations for DHS Acquisition 




Figure 2. Typical Phases of an AoA23 
A typical AoA takes, on average, over a year to complete and it includes seven 
steps. The AoA first identifies “challenges” (or threats) and develops a concept of 
operations (CONOPS); these processes happen in the first phase of the DHS Acquisition 
Life cycle, the Need phase. A gap analysis helps the organization identify what is missing 
in their capability to meet the current threats or operational requirements. The CONOPS 
outlines how the new financial system will help USCG and DHS operation and how it ties 
to DHS missions.  
After the challenges and CONOPS have been clearly defined, the AoA proceeds to 
metric development and identification of alternatives. The metric development process 
defines the performance measurements tied to the operational mission. Within the 
identification of alternatives step, market research is usually conducted to determine the 
availability and suitability of products and services. After identifying possible products that 
meet the project’s requirements, the AoA proceeds to analyze operational effectiveness and 
cost. The cost-effectiveness analysis calculates cost by evaluating the possible systems’ 
operational performance given the risks and constraints. The cost-benefit analysis simply 
weighs all the risks against the possible solutions at different cost levels to recommend the 
best service based on the level of funding available. OMB Circular A-94 defines program 
cost-effectiveness analysis as a quantitative method for comparing the cost of alternatives 
in order to select the lowest cost, with inflation included, for a given amount of benefits.24 
23 Streett, Analysis of Alternatives, 9. 
24 Office of Management and Budget, Guidelines and Discount Rates for Benefits-Cost Analysis of 
Federal Programs, OMB Circular A-94 (Washington, DC: Office of Management and Budget), 5, accessed 
April 23, 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/circulars/A94/a094.pdf. 
13 
However, the circular guidance encourages government agencies to perform cost-benefit 
analysis when considering different alternatives by holistically applying cost, policies and 
long-term effects on the government program.25  
David Trimble documented the best practices for an AoA in a 2014 GAO report. 
The report explains that identifying mission need or how the new acquired system would 
benefit the organization is the first requirement in the best practices for the AoA process.26 
In addition, the AoA must include all the methodologies and assumptions used in the 
analysis. Most importantly, the mission need and analysis in the AoA needs to be done 
without a predetermined solution. 
B. PROJECT REQUIREMENTS AND SCOPE 
During the first year DHS worked with DOI-IBC, from October 2013 to May 2014, 
the USCG identified numerous functional and technical requirements, reports, interfaces, 
and other complexities associated with transitioning to a new financial management 
program. Additional requirements, such as how the financial system should interface with 
human resources, procurement, and other asset systems such as aviation, and naval surface 
logistic systems, made the financial modernization more complicated. The USCG has 
many assets such as National Security Cutters, High Endurance Cutters, Fast Response 
Cutters, different types of small boats, in addition to helicopters MH-60 and MH-65, and 
airplanes C-27J and C-130.27 Each asset serves multiple missions that tie to DHS’s “six 
strategic missions and five non-homeland security missions.”28 It was challenging for 
DOI-IBC to support the transition of a big agency like the Coast Guard to a new financial 
system that required capabilities both to capture all current and future financial report needs 
and also to comply with all updated cyber security requirements.  
 
25 Office of Management and Budget, 18. 
26 David C. Trimble, DOE and NNSA Project Management: Analysis of Alternatives Could Be 
Improved by Incorporating Best Practices, GAO-16-37 (Washington, DC: Government Accountability 
Office, 2014), 44–45, https://www.gao.gov/assets/670/667404.pdf. 
27 “Coast Guard Operational Assets,” United States Coast Guard, accessed April 30, 2021, 
https://www.uscg.mil/About/Assets/. 
28 “Missions,” United States Coast Guard, accessed April 30, 2021, https://www.uscg.mil/About/
Missions/. 
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In testimony to the Committee on Homeland Security on Sep 26, 2017, DHS, TRIO 
and IBC representatives all agreed that lack of understanding of the complexity of the 
TRIO project requirement early in the Acquisition Life cycle affected DHS’s and IBC’s 
ability to complete the TRIO project on time.29 Such complexities had not been accounted 
for during the Analyze/Select acquisition phase market research in the 2013 AoA.30 
Because the phases of the Acquisition Life cycle are cumulative, poor execution of the 
early phases negatively impacts the subsequent ones. The extensive report on the DHS 
TRIO project published on September 26, 2017 documented that the project inadequately 
executed the AoA in the pre-acquisition phase. 
One major deficiency in TRIO’s AoA stemmed from not establishing a CONOPS 
during the Need phase. TRIO did not realize the one alternative it identified—DOI-IBC’s 
financial management services—would not meet all its needs, as TRIO failed to develop a 
CONOPS at the appropriate time. According to Asif Khan’s 2017 GAO report, the mission 
statement or CONOPS for the financial management project for USCG was supposed to 
be included as a part of the AoA, but the report found that the CONOPS was done after 
completion of the AoA.31 Before an acquisition project starts, the mission needs a 
statement of how the new project will support a government agency operation, which must 
occur in the pre-acquisition phase. In the absence of a CONOPS, the GAO report did not 
indicate what DHS used to help judge the suitability of the service they chose to acquire—
those of DOI-IBC.  
Another significant error that occurred during the pre-acquisition phases was that 
TRIO failed to analyze alternatives. The only service considered was a government shared 
service through DOI-IBC. The testimony indicated the TRIO project followed OMB 
guidance.32 OMB Memorandum M-13-08 directed executive agencies to use a federal 
 
29 Khan, DHS Financial Management: Improved Use, 9. 
30 Asif A. Khan, DHS Financial Management: Better Use of Best Practices Could Help Management 
System Modernization Project Risk, GAO-17-799 (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 
2017), https://www.gao.gov/assets/690/687362.pdf. 
31 Khan. 
32 H.R., DHS Financial Systems. 
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shared service—which is a service that one branch or agency of government provides to 
other branches or agencies of government—for modernizing their future financial 
management system when it is available.33 Using a shared service is designed to promote 
efficiency and eliminate duplication across government.34 The DHS TRIO Project limited 
its market research because DHS did not consider other alternatives outside the 
government. It only considered federal shared services under the guidance of this OMB 
memorandum. As a result, TRIO failed to evaluate which systems were available in the 
private sector to meet the technical requirements. Likewise, collectively, TRIO failed to 
account for the trade-offs between effectiveness and cost for each available option.35 
Contrary to AoA best practices, TRIO came into the AoA process with a predetermined 
solution, which was a federal shared service.  
TRIO also failed to thoroughly document risk assessment and risk mitigation 
strategies for technical risk and other risks such as cost and schedule. Figure 2 shows the 
typical risk analysis that should be conducted in an AoA before the service is selected to 
document major risks and how to mitigate those risks for each alternative.36 Acquisition 
programs then rank risks based on their impact on mission needs and functional 
requirements. All risks “are documented for each alternative along with any overarching 
or alternative specific mitigation strategies.”37 However, without a CONOPS, technical 
risk cannot be adequately measured. The CONOPS would have given TRIO a chance to 
do a better evaluation of the effectiveness of the new financial management system service 
to benefit DHS operational missions. This initial analysis could have also revealed that the 
 
33 Danny Werfel, “Improving Financial Systems through Shared Services,” M-13-08 (Memorandum 
for the heads of executive departments and agencies, Washington, DC: Office of Management of Budget, 
March 25, 2013), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/memoranda/2013/m-13-
08.pdf; Khan, DHS Financial Management: Better Use, 5. 
34 “Shared Services,” General Services Administration, accessed April 9, 2021, https://www.gsa.gov/
shared-services. 
35 Khan, DHS Financial Management: Better Use, 16. 
36 Marie A. Mark, Amphibious Combat Vehicle: Some Acquisition Activities Demonstrate Best 
Practices; Attainment of Amphibious Capability to Be Determined, GAO-16-22 (Washington, DC: 
Government Accountability Office, 2015), https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-16-22.pdf. 
37 Mark. 
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service would need substantial upgrades to meet TRIO’s needs. Identifying the system 
requirements after the AoA was completed hindered an effective technical analysis.  
Beyond the technical risks, all acquisition programs should also examine schedule 
and cost risks. TRIO had not documented cost and schedule risks as of July 2016, during 
the Obtain phase.38 TRIO did attempt a life-cycle cost estimate (LCCE) but did not do a 
thorough job. TRIO used the estimate from the service provider, DOI-IBC, instead of 
developing an LCCE on its own.39 After obtaining this cost estimate, the USCG failed to 
independently validate it.40 In the testimony, the USCG/TRIO did not explain its LCCE 
process or why it failed to complete this requirement correctly. However, the GAO report 
did indicate that the cost estimates relied on rough estimates, not on work broken down by 
structure or level.41 A more detailed analysis would have given a more accurate cost 
estimate. According to Tim Persons’ Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide, cost estimate 
should be well documented, all assumptions should be independently verified by a group 
other than cost estimators, and the estimate should be done by government not vendors.42 
In addition, the cost estimate should include adjusted inflation to capture the total cost and 
all the assumptions should be thoroughly documented so that auditors can replicate the cost 
estimate following the documented assumptions and processes.43 However, for the TRIO 
project, neither the USCG nor DOI-IBC applied net present value in the life cycle cost 
estimate. Furthermore, the cost estimate was done mostly by DOI-IBC in a manner that did 
not reflect best practices for cost estimate. Therefore, the original cost estimate for the 
TRIO project in 2013 and 2014 in the AoA was much lower than the actual cost of the 
project. Risk is included in the AoA and is inherently a part of every alternative in the AoA 
 




42 Timothy M. Persons, Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide: Best Practices for Developing and 
Managing Program Costs, GAO-20-195G (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 2020), 
https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-20-195g.pdf. 
43 Persons, 191–200. 
17 
process, yet TRIO’s lack of risk analysis resulted in unknowingly selecting a service 
provider with a high amount of risk, which contributed to the failure of the project. 
At the congressional hearing on DHS financial project in September 2017, DHS, 
DOI-IBC, the Office of the Financial Innovation and Transformation under Department of 
Interior (FIT) that oversees the federal shared service provider, and United States Shared 
Service (USSM) GSA all agreed on why the TRIO project failed.44 They noted that 
inability to grasp the full scope and complexity of the requirements of the DHS financial 
modernization project in its early phase affected the DOI-IBC and DHS’s ability to 
complete the financial management system as planned.45 During the first phase of the 
acquisition process, the TRIO project collectively failed to meet the benchmarks 
established in the AoA’s best practices. The TRIO project only partially met some of the 
AoA recommended practices (i.e., that each process should be well documented, 
comprehensive, unbiased, and credible).46 Table 1 is GAO’s evaluation of DHS TRIO 
Components’ AoA. It shows that both the USCG and TSA did not substantially meet the 
requirements for a reliable and high-quality AoA. Without a proper AoA and clearly 
defined requirements, TRIO failed to evaluate how the new financial system would support 
the DHS mission and the full scope of its total cost from development to software operation. 
 
44 Khan, DHS Financial Management: Better Use. 
45 Khan. 
46 Asif A. Khan, DHS Financial Management Improved Use of Best Practices Could Help Manage 
System Modernization Project Risks, Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Management 
Efficiency, Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives, GAO-17-803T (Washington, DC: 
Government Accountability Office, 2009). 
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Table 1. DHS TRIO Components’ Adherence to Characteristics of a 





C. LEADERSHIP AND EXPERTISE  
During the Obtain phase, DOI-IBC noted that they did not have the right resources 
and expertise in engineering and information technology, and that they suffered from high 
staff turnover that hindered the success of the project. In the subcommittee hearing in the 
House of Representatives, DHS and DOI-IBC officials stated that DOI-IBC had experienced 
many challenges with hiring federal employees and DOI-IBC was not able to hire the right 
expertise in time to meet the required deliverables for TRIO’s project. In addition, DOI-IBC 
experienced high turnover in key leadership and in positions that supported the TRIO 
project.48 In sum, DOI-IBC did not have the experienced staff to fulfill a large-scale and 
complex project like the TRIO.  
Another complication to the TRIO project was that it required significant 
customization to meet DHS’s six overarching operational missions and provide the ability to 
capture expenditures for each mission. Software customization is not recommended by J. R. 
Blanchette because the modifications to fit the customer’s needs are not part of the vendor’s 
 
47 Khan, DHS Financial Management: Better Use. 
48 H.R., DHS Financial Systems, 28. 
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line of product.49 Blanchette explains that customization may deviate from the vendor 
expertise and could result in unsuccessful software implementation or issues with 
maintenance later. In addition, under the shared service model in OMB Circular A-127, 
government agency customers usually request a service that the provider agency understands 
quite well and currently provides via software or system to existing customers.50 However, 
TRIO requested a newer version of the Oracle Federal Financial software (version 12.2), and 
DOI-IBC staff was unfamiliar with this version, as the September 2017 GAO 17–803T report 
found.51 Thus, on the one hand, DHS deviated from the regular business of government 
shared services. On the other hand, incorporating Oracle 12.2 version in 2014—which 
differed greatly from Oracle version 11.1 that DOI-IBC employed at the time—greatly 
increased the complexity of the project. As a result, the DOI-IBC lacked the necessary 
expertise to customize the system and meet the TRIO project’s needs. 
The GAO further found that DHS did not apply the concept of earned value 
management to the financial management project with DOI-IBC to the fullest extent 
necessary for effective acquisition management.52 The earned value management tool 
focuses on the combination of cost, schedule, technical process, and risk. Earned value 
management is often used as a measurement tool for acquisition program managers to assess 
acquisition progress to determine whether the programs meet schedule or budget. During 
testimony, a DHS official promised Congress that DHS would require earned value 
management from the next selected vendors for TRIO to ensure the quality for the project.53  
Moreover, the TRIO program lacked a communication strategy to dictate how the 
three DHS components—CWMD, TSA, and USCG—were to communicate with each other 
 
49 J. R. Blanchette, “Pros and Cons of Using COTS Products,” in IEEE Autotestcon 2005 (conference 
proceedings), (Orlando, FL: IEEE, 2005), 472–476, doi: 10.1109/AUTEST.2005.1609182. 
50 Office of Management and Budget, Financial Management Systems, interim final revision of OMB 
Circular A-127 (Washington, DC: Office of Management and Budget, 1999). https://www.whitehouse.gov/
wp-content/uploads/2017/11/Interim-Final-Revision-of-OMB-Circular-A-125-July11999.pdf. 
51 Khan, DHS Financial Management: Improved Use. 
52 Persons, Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide, 219. Earned Value Management is an acquisition 
management tool. It measures the value of actual work accomplished and compares it with the value of 
planned of value of work in a given period of time.  
53 H.R., DHS Financial Systems. 
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and with DOI-IBC. The TRIO program was not centrally managed during the acquisition 
process with DOI-IBC.54 The oversight of the TRIO program was split across the three DHS 
components. In the testimony to the Committee on Homeland Security, Mr. Chip Fulghum, 
a DHS official at the time, told the committee that “communication between TRIO and IBC 
was not cohesive, and was not well coordinated.”55As a result, it was challenging for both 
TRIO and DOI-IBC to collaborate for the new financial management system. The weak 
communication channel between TRIO and DOI-IBC caused difficulty in decision-making 
processes for any system changes during the acquisition processes.56  
D. BUSINESS PROCESS CHANGE 
Business process change includes change in management, change in management 
communication, the buy-in process (which involves end users), and the process of 
developing a new manual and training—which all occur in the Obtain phase of the DHS 
Acquisition Life cycle. Business process change is crucial for any acquisition program to be 
implemented successfully. When an organization implements a new system, it usually causes 
changes in day-to-day operations. Therefore, business process change involved the 
organizations’ changes, and the workforce’s changes to adapt to the new acquisition system. 
However, business process change must tie back to the architecture enterprise or how the 
new acquisition is to benefit and fit into the organization’s operational missions in the Need 
phase. Based on the congressional testimony in September 2017 and the two GAO reports 
that analyzed the failure of the TRIO project with DOI-IBC, DHS agreed that DHS had failed 
to prepare for change management by not involving all the stakeholders in the buy-in process 
and not helping the stakeholders understand how the new system would operate.57  
The TRIO project team focused on the delivery of the software and did not pay 
enough attention to change management.58 Consequently, the agency was not ready for the 
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55 Khan, DHS Financial Management: Improved Use. 
56 Khan, 33,45-47. 
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new financial management system. According to the Project Management Institute, the 
practice of change management is an inclusive, collaborative, “structured approach for 
transitioning individuals, groups, and organizations from a current state to a future state with 
intended business benefits or positive future outcomes.”59 Change management brings 
organizations, individuals, process and strategy together to collaborate toward a new process 
or new system. However, TRIO failed to take the program through an effective 
organizational change management process to transition to a new financial management 
system. Therefore, the TRIO failed many steps in the business process change.  
E. CONCLUSION 
The project moved forward despite the inadequate application of the steps in the pre-
acquisition phase, resulting in problems transitioning to the new financial system. The poor 
AoA execution resulted in poor definition of the project’s requirements and scope. 
Consequently, the DHS project required significant customization to meet agency 
operational needs. The fact that TRIO did not clearly define a CONOPS and did not 
document the risks and related mitigation strategies for the service it selected—when it 
should have also examined various alternatives—prevented DHS decision makers from 
performing a meaningful analysis necessary to balance between time and cost. This misstep 
prevented DHS from choosing a recommended alternative: regular commercial vendor, 
government shared service, or commercial shared service. In sum, TRIO established the 
project’s requirements during the Need and Analyze Select phases but failed to complete the 
AoA process and the CONOPS at the appropriate time. It also had weak leadership and 
project management, and failed to implement business process change. All of these factors 
contributed to the discontinuation of the TRIO project with DOI-IBC. DOI-IBC completed 
most of the implementation for the CWMD financial system, but TSA and USCG had to 
change to another commercial vendor for their financial modernization effort.  
 
59 J. Christopher Mihm and Robert Goldenkoff, Government Reorganization: Key Questions to Assess 
Agency Reform Efforts, GAO-18-427 (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 2018), 5–6, 
https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-18-427.pdf; Project Management Institute, Inc., Managing Change in 
Organizations: A Practice Guide (Newtown Square, PA: Project Management Institute, Inc., 2013), 19. 
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The TRIO program has taken steps to avoid further problems and to ensure the 
possibly of project success. Accordingly, in July 2017, the DHS Acquisition Review Board 
cancelled the TRIO project with DOI-IBC. Since the discontinuation of the TRIO project, 
DHS derived many lessons learned and applied them to the agency’s continuing financial 
system modernization efforts. During the hearing on September 26, 2017, DHS official Mr. 
Chip Fulghum said that DHS had taken lessons learned from the DOI-IBC engagement. DHS 
was more prepared to support the initiative going forward: “DHS has changed its 
implementation approach from individual component projects to a centralized DHS 
initiative.”60 The TRIO program has since added a Joint Program Management Office 
(JPMO). The JPMO has provided centralized program governance and streamlined decision 
making since the termination with DOI-IBC. Since 2017, the TRIO project has been 
administered within the newly formed Office of the Chief Financial Officer (OCFO), 
managed by the DHS Financial Systems Modernization JPMO61 with CWMD, TSA, and 
USCG engagement. 
In December 2017, the DHS Office of Procurement Operations awarded a System 
Deployment Agent support services contract to the IBM Corporation.62 IBM is currently the 
commercial shared service provider/contractor for the DHS TRIO project. Although CWMD 
completed the transition to a new financial system in October 2019, TSA and the USCG 
implementation have been delayed to FY21 and FY22.63 The DHS TRIO project remains in 
the Obtain DHS acquisition phase. 
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III. USCG HEALTH CARE PROJECT 
The second case study also falls within the DHS and covers the Coast Guard’s 
efforts to modernize its electronic health care system. Coast Guard Health Care services 
support 41 Coast Guard base clinics and 125 medical facilities afloat and ashore that treat 
over 50,000 active-duty members.64 In 2002, the Coast Guard implemented a Department 
of Defense (DOD) Composite Health Care System (CHCS) for medical record services 
including scheduling patient appointments and keeping medical records such as 
prescriptions and referrals. Furthermore, CHCS interoperated with other DOD health care 
systems such as prescription repositories, labs, and the military health insurance system.65 
In addition to implementing the CHCS, in 2004 the Coast Guard added another DOD 
system, the Provider Graphical User Interface (PGUI) to the health care system 
modernization effort. PGUI was an enhanced support system of CHCS intended for 
creating and keeping medical notes electronically.  
However, both the PGUI and CHCS systems lacked the capability to bill, schedule, 
and support case management. As a result, in 2009, the Coast Guard changed its 
modernization plan and set the intention to transition its medical system to a more modern 
system run by the DOD, called the Armed Forces Health Longitudinal Technology 
Application (AHLTA).66 Nevertheless, as noted by Coast Guard Health, Safety and Work 
Life (HSWL) in the GAO 18–59 report, once again, the Coast Guard changed its 
modernization plan in 2010 for two reasons: 1) the Coast Guard’s mission requirements 
differ from the DOD’s; and 2) the DOD’s modernization of its health care system—
AHLTA—was too expensive, so the Coast Guard decided to acquire its own medical 
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system. The Coast Guard’s new health care system was to be designed to interface with the 
DOD and the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA).67  
The Coast Guard awarded $14 million and a five-year contract to obtain an 
electronic health record (EHR) system from commercial vendors in September 2010. The 
new health care system was a commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) system that provided 
outpatient services including online schedules and patient records. The scope of the new 
health service system expanded beyond EHR modernization to include other services, and 
the name changed to the Integrated Health Information System (IHiS) project. The project 
cost total in 2010 was estimated at around $56 million, which included the initial cost of 
$14 million according to GAO-18-59 report.68 USCG contracted over 25 different vendors 
including Epic, Leidos, and other companies to support the IHiS project.69  
The new health care system under the IHiS project was to be implemented in phases 
with a few Coast Guard clinics in October 2015, and then at the other clinics, sick bays, 
and for Department of State locations. However, after five years into the Obtain phase and 
spending nearly $60 million on the project, the Coast Guard decided to cancel the IHiS 
project in October 2015.70 The IHiS issues such as cost, schedule and technical 
complexities were listed as the main reasons the Coast Guard canceled the project.71 The 
acquisition project resulted neither in useable software nor in any tangible assets to support 
the health care system in the future.72  
This chapter reviews how well the program defined the project requirements and 
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leadership and expertise for the project and how well leadership managed the business 
changes.  
A. PROJECT REQUIREMENTS AND SCOPE 
To evaluate the USCG health system modernization effort, this section reviews the 
IHiS project from project requirement and scope perspectives by reviewing how well the 
IHiS project applied the principles and guidance in the Acquisition Life cycle, especially 
in the Need and Analyze/ Select Phases. This section first describes the System 
Development Life Cycle (SDLC), the process the USCG stated it used to acquire the 
system. Then, the section reviews how the USCG applied the SDLC process for IHiS.  
1. System Development Life Cycle 
The USCG followed the non-major acquisition program and SDLC process 
developed by the CIO, office of the Assistant Commandant for C4&IT for the IHiS 
project.73 SDLC is the USCG Commandant’s instruction for developing an IT system from 
conceptual planning through design, development, testing, operation and maintenance and 
disposition.74 At the time of the IHiS acquisition project, non-major acquisition programs 
followed the SDLC process while major systems acquisition programs followed the major 
system acquisition manual and the System Engineering Life Cycle (SELC).75 The Coast 
Guard SDLC defines non-major acquisition programs as a those with acquisition budgets 
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under $300 million for the entire life cycle, from the Need phase to the Produce/Deploy/
Support/Dispose phase.76 At this time, SELC is mandated for all acquisition programs. As 
of 2019, the USCG has updated all major and non-major acquisition projects to use the 
SELC to comply with DHS Acquisition Instruction 102–01-001,77 which provides 
guidelines for the Acquisition Life cycle, instead of following the previous procedure, 
SDLC.  
The SDLC is a business engineering process embedded in the Acquisition Life 
cycle. Figure 3 compares the USCG acquisition decision events (ADEs) and Phases for 
Non-Major Acquisition Programs with the SDLC process. The USCG Acquisition Life 
cycle Framework in Figure 3 is represented by the top four boxes: Need phase, Analyze/
Select phase, Obtain phase, and the Produce/Deploy/Support/Dispose phase. There are 
seven phases in the SDLC process within the four phases of the Acquisition Life cycle: 1) 
conceptual planning 2) planning requirements, 3) design, 4) development and testing 5) 
implementation, 6) operational and maintenance, and 7) disposition78—the yellow blocks 
in Figure 3. The USCG’s explanation of the main processes in the seven phases of the 
SDLC is summarized in Table 2.  
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Figure 3. USCG Acquisition Life Cycle Framework with Acquisition 
Decision Event For Non-Major Acquisition Program.79 
Table 2. USCG System Development Life Cycle80 
Review Purpose 
1. Conceptual 
Planning Phase  
Program is supposed to validate the requirements of the acquisition 
program to meet the overall organization’s operational mission, also 
known as the enterprise architecture. Program also formalizes the 
roles and responsibilities, such as the project manager, asset 
manager, and establishing committees that provide the oversights 
for the program. 
2. Planning and 
Requirement 
Phase  
Program establishes a project plan including cost, estimate, work 
breakdown structure, risk management, and life cycle cost estimate. 
3. Design Phase Program develops the detailed system design to specify the 
operating system, architecture components, developing the 
operational analysis plan to document system measurement for 
reliability, maintainability and availability. This phase also covers 
training for the users, obtaining users inputs and enhancing user 
buy-in. 
4. Development 
and Testing Phase 
Testing happens in this phase. Users participate in testing to validate 
the system to meet the organization objectives and the users’ needs.  
5. Implementation  The new system obtains the approval for operation in the production 
environment. The program office coordinates training. 
 
79 Adapted from U.S. Coast Guard System Development Life Cycle, 20; Powner, Coast Guard Health 
Records, 34. 
80 Adapted from U.S. Coast Guard, System Development Life Cycle Practice Manual. 
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Review Purpose 
6. Operations and 
Maintenance  
The new acquisition system operates according to the specification 
and the program office continue to make sure the new system meets 
the organization’s and users’ needs. User training continues to 
happen in this process. User support continues.  
7. Disposition  This process is at the end of the system life cycle. It ensures that the 
system is disposed in accordance with law and regulations. 
 
In addition to these seven phases of the SDLC, there are three ADEs that every non-
major acquisition program has to complete before moving to the next phase. An ADE is an 
important check and balance tool in the acquisition framework. In order for a program to 
receive approval and move on to the next phase, it must prove that it has meet all technical 
requirements and risk assessments for the ADE as well as receive approval from the 
acquisition board review and organization management.81 ADE1 is the approval for an 
acquisition program, categorized as a non-major acquisition, and fulfills the requirement 
to move from the Need phase to the Analyze/Select phase. ADE2 is the approval of the 
AoA, which was described in detail in Chapter II, identified through market research and 
the approval to move into the Obtain phase. ADE3 is an authorization for the acquisition 
to enter the Produce/Deploy and Support phase. In Figure 3, the three ADEs are represented 
with triangles between each of the four main phases of the USCG Acquisition Life cycle. 
The implementation of these ADEs ensures the acquisition program can meet the targeted 
schedule and budget. 
2. Deficiencies in The USCG’s SDLC Process 
In 2018, GAO examined the IHiS project to evaluate whether the USCG applied 
the principles of the SDLC process and if the IHiS project had fulfilled the required steps 
in the SDLC project management practice. The review focused on: 1) conceptual planning 
2) planning requirements, 3) design, 4) development and testing. The GAO report found 
the Coast Guard completed some but not all the elements required in the SDLC or could 
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not provide all the documentation to show that it had completed all the elements required 
in the SDLC.82  
One major flaw of the USCG’s SDLC process was that it did not identify all the 
system’s needs in the conceptual planning phase. The Coast Guard tried to meet its limited 
budget in the early stages and, therefore, decided to forego many costly upgrades when it 
first identified the system’s needs.83 However, the USCG did not stick with these limited 
requirements after moving to the Obtain phase.84 Neither the USCG nor GAO indicated 
the reasons for adding additional requirement during the Obtain phase. However, the main 
cause for this late addition of requirements can be attributed to the poor AoA that the USCG 
executed in the previous phases. The USCG did not establish all the project’s requirements 
in the Need phase, which negatively affected its ability to select the best service provider. 
While the USCG moved to the Obtain phase for the project in 2010, it increased its 
requirements various times, which threatened the project’s success. The USCG identified 
the need to upgrade the safety of data management, work-life case management, and an 
integrated patient portal that would allow patients to access their medical record at any 
time. As a result, it added a service-wide Health, Safety, and Work Life (HSWL) IT re-
engineering project when it changed from EHR to IHiS in the end of 2010.85 However, the 
addition of requirements in the Obtain phase increased costs and extended the schedule. In 
addition, in 2012, the Department of State signed an interagency agreement with the Coast 
Guard to employ IHiS for the State Department personnel in an attempt to keep the project 
costs low. Adding another user to the IHiS added even more new requirements to the 
system. Failure to finalize project requirements and scope effectively caused the IHiS 
project to suffer cost and schedule increases and jeopardized the successful implementation 
of the software.  
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Without knowing the requirements in the Need phase, the USCG could not validate 
alignment between the project requirements with the enterprise architecture in the 
conceptual planning phase.86 The validation of project requirement alignment would have 
identified that IHiS did not meet the USCG Health Care program’s objectives at an early 
stage. Neither the USCG nor the GAO clarified why the USCG did not validate alignment 
between IHiS and the USCG’s health care system’s operational missions. The conceptual 
and planning and requirement phases should have included a project description, a 
breakdown of work objectives with project milestones, a communication plan, project 
standards and procedures, and lists of personnel assigned to the selected SDLC.87 
However, the report found that the USCG did not complete or only partially completed 
some of the required phases in the SDLC for IHiS, possibly because of oversight issues. It 
also found that the work breakdown structure, project schedule, and project milestones 
were partially but not completely done in the planning and requirement phase. The GAO 
report did not explain the reasons why there were such missteps on the USCG’s part; the 
report only indicated those deficiencies.  
A further contributing factor that allowed the requirements and scope to get out of 
hand was insufficient ADE exit approval. The GAO reported that no documentation was 
provided for ADE1. ADE1 would have entailed documentation of all the necessary reviews 
by decision authorities to assess whether IHiS was ready to move from the Need phase to 
the Analyze/Select phase in the DHS Acquisition Life cycle. With completion of the ADE1 
review process, the USCG and DHS management would have caught any risks or program 
issues. The IHiS program along with the DHS and USCG management would have had a 
chance to fix the issues before the IHiS program moved further along in the acquisition 
process.  
In addition, even though the GAO 18–59 reported that IHiS received ADE2 with 
deficiencies,88 because the project failed the testing in the Obtain phase, it is safe to draw 
 
86 Powner, 14. 
87 Powner, Coast Guard Health Records. 
88 Powner, Coast Guard Health Records. 
31 
the conclusion that IHiS did not complete all the appropriate steps to pass this ADE. The 
Acquisition Life cycle processes embedded in the life cycle are cumulative and connected 
with one another. However, without completing a solid ADE1, even if ADE2 was properly 
done, there would still be problems in the Obtain phase.   
B. LEADERSHIP AND EXPERTISE  
Four governance bodies were supposed to oversee the IHiS project: the Executive 
Steering Committee, the Change Control Board, the System Security Committee, and the 
User Group.89 The Executive Steering Committee intended to monitor the acquisition 
process and approve any changes in scope and requirements for the project. The Change 
Control Board set out to evaluate any technical changes that would impact cost and 
schedule and recommend changes to the project baseline. The System Security Committee 
served as risk managers and helped to identify and mitigate risks for the IHiS project. The 
User Group served as advisors on any recommendations that would affect the functionality 
of the system and served as the advocate for system users.90 The User Group committee’s 
main purpose was to help the program office with program decisions on system design 
with user interests in mind.  
These four committees were formed to govern and inform their recommendations 
to the IHiS program management office. Although these governance bodies were to 
oversee the IHiS project, according to the GAO report, the USCG record showed that the 
committees were not actively overseeing the IHiS project as they should have been before 
the IHiS project discontinuance in late 2015.91 The lack of oversight from the four 
committees and the coordination between the committee and the program manager92 
showed weak leadership commitment for IHiS success. As mentioned in the SDLC’s 
deficiencies section, the USCG did not fully complete the required steps in the conceptual 
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planning and planning requirements under the Need and Analyze/Select acquisition phases. 
Effectively completing these phases would have enabled these committees to better support 
the IHiS program. The lack oversight in IHiS contributed to the termination of the project.  
Moreover, the CIO was not on any governance committees.93 This could possibly 
be due to a lack of oversight and integration among USCG offices or it could have been 
negligence on the part of the USCG. The CIO should have been in one of the governance 
committees and should have been involved in most aspects of the system or software 
development and the SDLC. The CIO plays important roles in information technology 
acquisition. According to the Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996, CIOs are responsible for 
providing advice, guidance and assistance to agency heads on IT acquisition and 
Information Resource Management.94 Acquisition programs related to information 
technology (IT) or IT connection are mandated to have the CIO sign off on each acquisition 
milestone. In addition, the Federal Information Technology Acquisition Reform Act 
requires the CIO’s involvement for all federal agencies involved with the decision 
processes and policies related to information technology resources and all information 
systems and software development acquisition projects.95 Nevertheless, in the IHiS 
project, the CIO was virtually absent. The facts that IHiS lacked oversight from different 
governance bodies and especially that the CIO was not included in one of the governance 
committees represented big missteps for the IHiS project. The CIO should have served as 
one of the stakeholders and the technical experts who would provide technical guidance 
and oversight to IHiS system development project to ensure the project delivery was on 
schedule, on budget, and could meet the program objectives.  
In addition to a lack of leadership, a lack of expertise to support an acquisition 
program was also an issue in the IHiS acquisition. Expertise in an acquisition team usually 
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includes a program manager, technical specialists, engineers, contracting officer, cost 
analyst, budget officer and legal advisor.96 The composition of the acquisition team may 
vary and it is an interdisciplinary team who work together to meet the requirements and 
the objectives of an acquisition project. Change in management staff and a lack of clearly 
defined responsibilities were listed as deficiencies in the GAO 18–59 report.97 The GAO 
report cited the roles and responsibilities among stakeholders, responsible parties, and 
decision makers were not clearly defined because of the high staff turnover.98 High 
turnover in staff could result in a shortage of expertise and therefore severely affect the 
project. For instance, it would normally take time for the new employees to get up to speed 
and familiarize themselves with the project. A study of staff turnover in acquisition, 
assimilation and their impact on software development projects shows that staff turnover 
can result in detrimental effects on programs with significant cost increases and schedule 
delays.99  
Another major flaw with adequate leadership was that the USCG overlooked the 
legal consequences and the disruption to the acquisition process of incorporating the State 
Department’s health care system into IHiS. Legality issues arose with collecting and using 
funding from the State Department.100 GAO said that the initial reason for its review of 
the IHiS project was to identify if the Coast Guard misused funding without congressional 
approval. When a program goes through the Anti-Deficiency Act (ADA), the employees 
who are involved in the program could possibly be subject to penalties of fines, 
imprisonment, or both. The agency has to report the violation to the President and 
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Congress.101 Therefore, the review for the ADA alone could potentially cause a stop on 
the acquisition program. The GAO 18–59 report did not disclose whether the USCG had 
the authority to enter an interagency agreement with the State Department as a health care 
systems service provider.102 GAO also did not mention anything about how the State 
Department requirements were incorporated into the IHiS project.103 As mentioned in the 
requirements and scope section, adding the State Department to the project happened after 
IHiS entered the Obtain phase. Leadership clearly ignored the life cycle acquisition phases, 
which caused the program to increase its technical complexity in addition to possibly 
violating the ADA. 
C. BUSINESS PROCESS CHANGE 
Business process change is crucial for every acquisition project, especially the big 
ones. Business process change involves planning for how organizations would do their 
usual business using the new system. The IHiS project was in the Obtain phase for five 
years by the time it was terminated, so the USCG and the State Department health care 
work force should have been undergoing business process change during this phase. 
However, as the GAO report mentioned, the USCG did not develop the process changes 
or help the USCG or State Department health care work force get ready for the roll-out of 
IHiS.104  
The user manual and the testing process were missing in the IHiS project. The 
manual and training would allow employees to be familiarized with the new system and 
help the organization smoothly transition to the new system. The user manual usually 
defines the policies and processes for users to follow when they use or operate a new 
system.105 However, the Coast Guard did not develop a user manual that specified how to 
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use and operate the IHiS system.106 This could be considered an internal control weakness, 
which was one of the deficiencies listed in the GAO report.107  
In addition, system testing was also missing.108 Its absence negatively impacts the 
buy-in process. The purpose of the testing process is to make sure the new system meets 
the organization’s operational objectives. Users usually participate in the testing phase. 
Their participation enhances the buy-in process and ensures the new acquisition system 
meets the users’ needs. In sum, the testing process validates that the new acquisition system 
operates properly and meets all technical and business requirements as set in the 
Conceptual Planning and Planning and Requirement phases in the SDLC process, or the 
Need and Analyze/Select phases in the DHS and USCG Acquisition Life cycle 
Framework.109  
The IHiS project did not involve the users in participating in the testing of the 
system, did not develop a user manual, and did not include the users in the user oversight 
committee, all of which are main components of the business change process. Without a 
concrete business change process in place, the acquisition program would not be 
successfully implemented. In turn, the acquisition program would neither be well accepted 
nor add any value to the organization.  
D. CONCLUSION 
The GAO 18–59 reflected on the many mistakes in the IHiS project. The project 
lacked benchmarks for project success, so the project team could not determine whether 
the project was on track for completing project operational objectives. The IHiS project 
lacked approval or visibility to the stakeholders. Furthermore, in the Obtain phase, the 
USCG did not develop a training manual for use of the new health care system and added 
new requirements from the State Department two years after the IHiS project had begun. 
Moreover, the USCG did not anticipate the legality issues with collecting and using 
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funding from the State Department.110 Consequently, in October 2015, the Coast Guard 
cancelled and closed out the interagency agreement with the State Department and 
terminated the IHiS project. Cost, schedule and technical complexity were cited as reasons 
for discontinuation of the project.111 The time and money invested in the project could 
have been invested in an alternative product that aligned more closely with the USCG 
Health Care program’s objectives.  
Currently, the USCG has joined the DOD and the Department of Veterans Affair 
in using MHS GENESIS as of June 8, 2018.112 This program is currently in the Obtain 
phase as the new EHR system for the Military Health System for Army, Navy, and Air 
Force, and the USCG. Like its predecessor, this system is an automated medical 
information system that supports health care administration and record keeping. The Coast 
Guard Health Care program is on the right track to transition from the Obtain phase to the 
Produce/Deploy/Support/Disposition phase.113 
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This chapter reviews the HealthCare.gov project. The Centers for Medicare & 
Medicaid Services (CMS), operating under the Department of Health and Human Services, 
designed the website HealthCare.gov to facilitate health care registration under the 
Affordable Care Act (ACA). The ACA intended to increase health care access to all 
Americans. With the ACA, states can create their own health care exchanges or join the 
federal program via HealthCare.gov.114 However, when it launched in October 2013 the 
website encountered several problems. It could not handle the number of users, it gave 
erroneous health care rates, and the website was down for a long period of time during the 
first week it was launched. In addition to failure in the first launching period, the website’s 
development costs were expected to be $292 million but jumped to $2.1 billion, per a 
Bloomberg report in September 2014.115 As a result, the GAO did a study on the 
HealthCare.gov project.116 The GAO study reviewed all the systems that supported the 
website to address the deficiencies contributing to the website failure on the first launch, 
and recommended lessons learned moving forward. The report was published in March 
2015.  
Accordingly, this chapter identifies the factors that contributed to the project’s 
shortcomings when it was first launched. This chapter reviews the initial efforts of the 
HealthCare.gov project, the deficiencies in project requirements and scope, leadership, 
expertise, and project business change management that led to the failures in October 2013.  
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A. BACKGROUND 
The HealthCare.gov website is a public website, designed for the American public 
to browse health care insurance plans and enroll in a coverage plan. Some Americans who 
have low income are eligible for financial assistance to cover premiums and other health 
care insurance costs. The health care website linked to multiple support systems from other 
government agencies such as the Department of Health and Human Services, Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS), Social Security Administration, and DHS to verify individual 
identity and eligibility. It also linked to credit report companies like Equifax, Inc. to verify 
income amount. In addition, the HealthCare.gov website links to different market insurers 
for different health care plan options and prices. The website is, thus, one of the most 
complicated large-scale information technology systems in the United States government. 
Figure 4 is an overview of the systems supporting HealthCare.gov. 
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Figure 4. Overview of Systems Supporting the Federal Facilitated Market 
place.117  
HealthCare.gov provides basic information on how insurance plans work through 
the Federal Marketplace. It includes the Enterprise Identity Management system that 
checks an individual’s identity through his or her social security number and date of birth. 
The CMS Enterprise Identity Management system houses the applicants’ log-in accounts 
and user identities. This system provides users log-in access and monitors applicants’ 
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accounts at HealthCare.gov.118 After the applicants have successfully set up their accounts 
through the Enterprise Identity Management system, their information transfers to the 
Federal Facilitated Marketplace (FFM) system. 
1. Federally Facilitated Marketplace System 
The GAO report describes the FFM system as a “database system that processes 
transactions to facilitate the eligibility verification process, enrollment process, plan 
management, financial management services, and other functions, such as quality control 
and oversight.” 119 The FFM uses cloud-based services that provide data processing and 
storage space from private sector vendors over the Internet. The FFM consists of “three 
major modules: eligibility and enrollment, plan management, and financial 
management.”120 
a. Eligibility and Enrollment Module  
The Enterprise Identity Management (EIDM) system “allows applicants to create 
accounts and verify their identities on HealthCare.gov and sends information requests from 
the Federal Marketplace (Health Insurance Marketplace) to other government 
agencies.”121 First, the applicants must enter their personal information such as social 
security number, birthdate, and address. CMS then verifies the applicant’s identity though 
the eligibility enrollment process. The applicant’s personal information is transmitted 
through the DHS and Social Security Administration to determine eligibility.122 Then, 
individuals can apply for health care coverage through HealthCare.gov. After the applicant 
completes the eligibility process through the eligibility and enrollment module, he or she 
can begin the insurance registration process.  
 






State, government, medical, and budget systems had to connect to the FFM system 
and the federal Data Service Hub (DSH). DSH supports many functions related to health 
care enrollment. As explained by Levinson in a report for the Department of Health and 
Human Services, “Most states need to connect their state Medicaid and state Children’s 
Health Insurance Program (CHIP) agencies to either the FFM system (through the DSH) 
or their state-based marketplace to exchange data with CMS about enrollment in these 
programs.”123 In addition, several other government and non-government agencies—the 
Departments of Defense and VA, the Office of Personnel Management, and the Peace 
Corps—connect to CMS to determine if potential applicants are eligible for or currently 
enroll in the states and federal subsidies coverage. If they are, they would not be eligible 
to receive the government subsidies such as advance payment of the tax credit and 
insurance cost reductions.124  
b. Plan Management Module  
The plan management module is designed to facilitate the health care plans and 
costs among the insurance companies, health care providers, and the Department of Human 
Services via the CMS.125 Health care providers and states use the plan management 
module to monitor health care plans. Health care providers use this module to request 
health care payments to the state.126 Insurance companies also use the plan management 
module for bidding on or submitting the insurance plans’ costs to states. CMS uses this 
module to review the health care plan costs, and it monitors and certifies the insurance plan 
bids that insurance companies and states submit.127 Once the insurance company passes 
the bidding process and receives approval to participate in the health care market place 
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through HealthCare.gov, the insurance companies offer health care plans available for the 
applicant to select and enroll.128 
c. Financial Management Module  
Participating insurance companies submit and receive health care payments 
through the financial management module.129 Although not all 50 states participate in the 
ACA, all participating states, along with CMS, use this module to calculate payments and 
cost reductions through subsidies polices, and to set the price for applicants’ health care 
insurance plan. This model is used to calculate insurance plan cost and process payment 
between CMS and insurance companies.  
2. The Federal Data Service Hub (DSH) 
The Federal DHS processes and transfers information related to health care and cost 
among FFM, CMS, private sectors, other government agencies, and states. States relay the 
health care plan and applicant’s personal information to the IRS through the Federal DSH; 
in return, the IRS gives states the subsidy eligibility amounts, such as advanced payments 
of premium tax credits. The DHS is a “cloud service” that processes all the information 
related to eligibility, enrollment, and plans.130 
3. CMS Health Insurance Oversight System 
Once the applicants have completed the enrollment process, the CMS Health 
Insurance Oversight System would issue the health care plan via the FFM system. The 
health care plans would be available via HealthCare.gov. The CMS Health Insurance 
Oversight System processes applications and sends out health care insurance plan through 
FFM. CMS monitors and controls the Health Insurance Oversight System.  
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B. PROJECT REQUIREMENTS AND SCOPE 
As soon as HealthCare.gov was launched and opened to the public on October 1, 
2013, the website encountered many problems. A lot of issues derived from not defining 
the requirements in a timely manner. Defining scope and project requirements should have 
happened in the first phase of the acquisition, the Need phase. However, the political effects 
of the ACA law had negative effects on the project requirements.131 For instance, CMS 
and HHS wanted states to have autonomy to either create and maintain their own insurance 
marketplaces or to join the Federal Marketplace.132 Some states were against the Federal 
Marketplace, and in these cases the CMS would revise policy to give more flexibility to 
accommodate these states.133 The Department of HHS Office of Inspector General’s (HHS 
OIG) report indicated that “CMS’s lack of clarity in defining key marketplace functions, 
which traces back to conflicting statutory interpretation and debates about policy choices,” 
resulted in CMS’s inability to lock down the requirements and scope.134 All these changes 
triggered late changes in the scope and project requirements that would in turn delay the 
project and cause technical issues later since the requirements were not properly vested and 
were not finalized before the project moved to the next phase of the acquisition process.  
Another issue with HealthCare.gov was that the program did not lock down the 
requirements early in the acquisition process as it should have done. All the system 
requirements should have been firmly established in the Initiation and Planning Phase and 
Requirement Analysis and Design Phases (see Figure 5), which are similar to the DHS 
Need phase and Analyze/Select Phase. Instead, the HHS employees were under schedule 
pressures to launch the HealthCare.gov website on time regardless of the issues during the 
development phase.135 Moreover, the HealthCare.gov project stagnated because the ACA 
law was under Supreme Court review for almost two years to determine whether the law 
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could mandate individuals to purchase health insurance.136 These challenges to the law 
caused uncertainties regarding possible changes in the implementation of the ACA and, 
therefore, the HealthCare.gov website. As of June 2012, the Supreme Court ruled that the 
ACA, including the mandate for individual Americans to buy health insurance, was 
constitutional.137 However, the final decision from the Supreme Court was only just over 
a year before the HealthCare.gov website was to be launched in October 2013 and all the 
final changes in the requirements were supposed to have already been built into the website. 
CMS continued to make changes in policy along with technical and business requirements 
up to early 2013, just a few months before the website launch on October 1, 2013.138 
Ultimately, the last-minute changes caused the CMS and contractors who developed the 
HealthCare.gov website to run out of the time needed to test and fix the errors before the 
launch. The last-minute changes caused the HealthCare.gov website not to provide the 
correct insurance plan rates based on the applicants’ information submitted and processed 
through three modules, “eligibility and enrollment, plan management, and financial 
management.”139 Figure 5 shows the Enterprise Life Cycle Model, a guideline for 
information system from CMS which includes progress reviews and three major 
acquisition phases: Initiation and Planning, Development and Implementation, and 
Operations and Maintenance.  
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Figure 5. IT Enterprise Life Cycle Model.140  
All the late changes and attention to policy instead of careful website development 
caused delays in the schedule. The ACA was one of the most contentious laws in U.S. 
history. As of 2017, there had been more than 70 attempts to repeal it since it was first 
signed into law on March 23, 2010.141 The deadline for states to set up and manage their 
own insurance marketplaces or to participate in the Federal Marketplace supported under 
the law was extended to December 2012.142 The number of states joining the Federal 
Marketplace affected health care coverage and also affected policy and content of the 
website.143 Many policy changes that required software changes to support the 
HealthCare.gov website arose late in the development phase. CMS continued to make 
changes in policy along with technical and business requirements up to early 2013, just a 
few months before the website launched on October 1, 2013.144 While the delayed changes 
in the requirements were outside of CMS’s control, these late changes hindered the 
project’s success. 
CMS underestimated the number of potential applicants who would visit the 
website, which negatively impacted the site’s performance. The HealthCare.gov site 
experienced many operational issues as soon it was open for public use. The website 
crashed within two hours after being launched and only six applicants completed their 
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enrollment on that first day.145 The HealthCare.gov website was opened for public use 
with inadequate capacity to handle the number of applicants. According to HHS OIG’s 
report in February 2016, approximately 250,000 users logged into the website on its first 
day, which far exceeded its built-in capacity.146 The surge caused the website to run very 
slowly and sometimes took it offline completely.147 Applicants received error messages 
and some who successfully created accounts had difficulty in logging in.148 The website 
was not built with enough capacity for an adequate number of virtual machines and 
processes.149 According to the HHS OIG’s report, the HealthCare.gov website was down 
more than 50 percent of the time in early November 2013.150 By the end of November 
2013, the website availability improved to 90 percent. However, according to HHS Office 
of Inspector General, the “website outage during the first month of its launch” caused a lot 
of confusion and frustration for the users who tried to enroll in a health care plan or find 
out the available health care plan options.151 There were two enrollment periods: October 
1, 2013 to March 31, 2014 and from November 15, 2014 to February 2015. CMS reported 
that there were over eight million individuals who applied and selected their health care 
plans during the first enrollment period. During the second period of enrollment, over an 
additional 8.8 million Americans had submitted their applications as of January 2015.152 
In the congressional testimony in November 2013, the CMS administrator admitted that 
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The lack of clearly establishing the site requirements and testing the site’s functions 
before the site was launched created technical difficulties rendering the site unable to 
perform its main functions. In February 2014, the Federal Market system that linked to the 
three modules that interconnect within the HealthCare.gov site—eligibility and enrollment, 
plan management, and financial management—did not process 2.6 million applicants’ 
information correctly.154 For example, the Office of Inspector General found that “the 
Federal Marketplace was not able to validate an applicant’s social security number.”155 
This problem should have been identified in the Initiation and Planning phase. After the 
review, HHS OIG concluded that there were some issues with FFM internal control 
measures. For example, FFM failed to verify applicants’ social security numbers in the 
beginning of the process as it was designed to.156 If these systems measures properly 
worked as checkpoints, the HealthCare.gov website would have been able to provide 
proper rates for applicants. Since the requirements had not been clearly defined and vetted 
by the system stakeholders, including the project owner and developer, the project failed 
to meet the requirements and operational objectives. In this case, CMS failed to estimate 
the required capacity for the website and clearly failed to understand how the website 
would operate to meet the ACA’s objectives. In sum, CMS failed to understand the scope 
and to lock down the requirements in accordance with the Acquisition Life cycle process, 
which negatively affected the project.  
C. LEADERSHIP AND EXPERTISE  
Having the right expertise and strong leadership plays an important role in the 
success of big acquisition projects such as HealthCare.gov. However, there were many 
issues in leadership and expertise for the HealthCareg.gov project such as high turnover in 
leadership positions, a lack of information system and engineering skills, and leadership’s 
failure to utilize the management tool to provide oversight to the program.  
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One of the most crucial assets for any project is human capital. With the 
HealthCare.gov project, many employees in HHS involved in the development of 
HealthCare.gov had experience in the insurance market but did not have any experience 
with information technology, system development, or managing the development of a large 
and complex government project such as the HealthCare.gov.157 This lack of expertise 
would have serious consequences for the project such as poor technical decisions, not being 
able to translate policies to technical needs, not being able to help the program meet the 
policy requirements, and the site’s poor performance and usability. One example that OIG 
pointed out was “CMS continued on a failing path to developing HealthCare.gov despite 
signs of trouble, making rushed corrections shortly before the launch that proved 
insufficient and CMS made poor connections between policy and technical work.”158 The 
lack of expertise in engineering and procurement led to bad acquisition decisions.  
The project’s high turnover rate of key leadership positions stretched other 
employees too thin and allowed for many details to be overlooked. According to the HHS 
OIG review, the HealthCare.gov project had a high turnover rate in many key and staff 
positions, which created vacancies that increased the workload and stress and reduced the 
organizational knowledge and relationships among staff.159 CMS had a high turnover 
especially among the staff who supported the Federal Marketplace program as CMS lost 
many management positions who were under the CIO Office.160 Personnel in the CIO 
Director- and Deputy-level positions often held these roles for less than one year from 2011 
to 2015.161 One management position in the program—a director position—was filled by 
seven different incumbents in the four year period from 2011 to 2015. HHS OIG conducted 
their review of the HealthCare.gov program’s operation from 2011 to 2015, and found that 
the high turnover was mostly due to heavy workload and short deadlines.162 The HHS OIG 
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also discovered 30 of 45 the Director- and Deputy-level positions were unfilled during 
those four years. In addition, in that period of time, CMS filled those vacant positions with 
staff who were temporarily assigned from other parts of CMS to serve in an “acting” or 
temporary capacity, according to HHS OIG.163 The acting capacity can have negative 
consequences for the project: those employees would serve multiple positions and divide 
their attention between their acting and their regular assigned positions. The acting roles 
affected the leadership in CMS because employees could not provide all the needed 
attention to the project. In addition, the OIG report also pointed out that one of the 
important positions that was responsible for managing “premium rates” at CMS was vacant 
for about two years from 2011–2013.164 There was significant turnover in many CMS staff 
positions that managed and oversaw the Federal Marketplace contracts.165 In sum, the high 
turnover rate and the long-term vacancies made it difficult to pass down the organizational 
knowledge and technical skills and made it harder for the CMS to collaborate.  
Since the HealthCare.gov website must interface with different government and 
private sectors including insurance companies’ information systems, CMS had greatly 
underestimated the complexity that required great leadership and oversight. The failure in 
leadership is reflected through their deficiency in reviewing and approving the program 
milestones and progress reviews. For instance, as described in the GAO report, CMS 
designated the FFM, DSH, and EIDM systems to be highly complex systems. CMS 
guidance recommends an IT project to go through the IT Enterprise Life Cycle reviews as 
listed in Figure 5 and in Table 3.166 In spite of this, “the three systems did not undergo all 
the recommended reviews in the IT Enterprise Life Cycle.”167 Table 3 describes the review 
sequence in the IT Enterprise Life Cycle process. 
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Determines whether the proposed project potentially duplicates, interferes, 




Determines if the IT project is sound and viable, among other things. The business 
need and objectives are reviewed to ensure the effort supports CMS’s overall 
mission and objectives. 
Project Baseline 
 
Obtains management approval that the scope, total cost of the project and schedule 
that have been established for the project are adequately documented. The project 
management strategy is appropriate for moving the project forward in the life cycle. 
Requirements Verifies that the requirements are complete, accurate, consistent, and problem-free; 
evaluates the responsiveness to the business requirements. 
Preliminary 
Design 
Verifies that the preliminary design satisfies the functional and nonfunctional 
requirements and conforms with the CMS Technical Reference Architecture; 
determines the technical solution’s completeness and consistency with CMS 
standards. 
Detailed Design Verifies that the final design satisfies the functional and nonfunctional 
requirements and conforms with the CMS Technical Reference Architecture; 




Ensures that the system/application has completed thorough development testing 




Ensures that the system/application has completed thorough integration testing and 




Ensures that the infrastructure contractor’s operational staff has the appropriate 
startup and shutdown scripts, accurate application architecture documentation, 
application validation procedures, and valid contact information to ensure 
operability of infrastructure application. 
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Ensures that the system/application completed its implementation processes 
according to plan and that it is ready for turnover to the operations & maintenance 
team and operational release into the production environment. 
Post-
Implementation 
Assesses how well the system/application performance meets its goals and 
recommends continued operations, changes to operations, or retirement. 
 
The CMS leadership failed to utilize management tools such as progress reviews in 
the Acquisition Life cycle to monitor and provide oversight.169 For example, “CMS noted 
that the HealthCare.gov had project process agreement for the EIDM system in January 
2012 which stated that of the 11 progress and milestone reviews, with the exception of the 
Investment Selection Review, all ten reviews were mandated with proof for each 
review.”170 However, the agency could only prove that it performed four of the ten reviews 
despite that CMS officials claim that nine had been held (see Figure 6).171 Consequently, 
the GAO reported that “CMS did not keep good records of each review, decision logs, or 
lessons learned for each program review.”172 These reviews are crucial to determine 
whether the project is on the right track for development purposes. A progress review is 
one of the major management tools for leadership to review the programs’ progress, 
provide oversight, support and intervene if necessary. CMS provided evidence that they 
had completed some but not all the recommended reviews for DSH and FFM. Figure 6 
shows the reviews a highly complex system should have had and GAO’s assessment of 
whether those reviews were held for each system. 
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Figure 6. GAO Evaluation for Progress and Milestone Reviews Held for 
Systems Supporting HealthCare.gov.173  
The major system, FFM, did not have a review for the system requirements, which 
is another misstep for the project’s leadership. According to the GAO report, most of the 
system requirements for the FFM were not approved by CMS officials prior to system 
development. GAO examined 37 FFM eligibility and enrollment functional requirements, 
only nine of which CMS had approved. For the remaining 28 FFM requirements, eight had 
been “approved after being sent to development,” but CMS never approved the other 20.174 
Both the GAO and HHS OIG did not indicate how the project moved forward without 
going through the approval process for each functional requirement. However, these 
missteps in the approval process over the program’s review showed the weakness in 
leadership. For example, CMS designated the DSH and the FFM as complex, but CMS did 
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not go through all progress reviews as required.175 The lack of leadership’s participation 
and documentation in the progress reviews was the weakness in the leadership’s role.  
Another issue with the HealthCare.gov leadership was the use of an unfamiliar 
technology, which is not a recommended practice.176 Leadership usually approves the 
program to follow a certain technology through the review process. For the HealthCare.gov 
project, CMS chose to combine two types of database platforms, one traditional and one 
nontraditional, instead of the commonly used traditional platform database per the HHS 
OIG report.177 Oracle defines a database as an “organized collection of structured 
information, or data that stored electronically in a computer system.”178 The traditional 
platform has been around for quite some time, and it is widely used. Most engineers or IT 
specialists who are experienced with Oracle would be familiar with the traditional platform. 
However, the nontraditional NoSQL platform offers more capabilities, can transfer data 
faster than the traditional platform, and has the capability to add more data or users.179 
However, NoSQL platforms were not as popular and widely used as the traditional 
platform. There were fewer developers who had experience with the nontraditional NoSQL 
platform at the time of HealthCare.gov project development. Per the HHS OIG report, 
MarkLogic, the vendor that was responsible for the NoSQL platforms, did not have the 
right expertise in its team, so the use of the NoSQL platforms caused significant issues for 
the FFM build.180 
Lastly, GAO reported a lack of leadership from the executive branch, the Office of 
Management and Budget. HHS, CMS, and the OMB were supposed to collaborate with 
each other to support the HealthCare.gov website development. GAO noted that the 
HealthCare.gov project was not included in the federal IT dashboard, monitored by 
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OMB.181 The OMB Information Technology dashboard is used to monitor risk and 
performance for all federal government IT projects. Since the HealthCare.gov project was 
not included on this dashboard, OMB failed to perform oversight, report, and monitor risk 
and issues with the project costs, schedule, and performance. This lapse represents another 
layer of leadership failure by the OMB.  
The HealthCare.gov program suffered various issues with leadership and expertise 
such as not having employees with the required skillsets, and was not able to fill all the key 
positions. In addition, the program did not have strong leadership to provide oversight and 
champion the program. The weakness in leadership and lack of the required skills in the 
HealthCare.gov program hampered the program’s success.  
D. BUSINESS PROCESS CHANGE 
Business process change is all about communicating the changes to the stakeholders 
and having the stakeholders involved in the project. One of the ways to have stakeholders’ 
involved is including them in the testing process, which helps the stakeholders become 
familiar with the new system and gives them an opportunity to provide their input. For the 
HealthCare.gov project, there were many deficiencies in the business process change, 
primarily in the testing process. CMS has a testing framework documented in the IT 
Enterprise Life Cycle guidelines that describes how to test the software before deploying 
it to the Operations and Maintenance Phase, yet it did not execute all the required tests for 
the HealthCare.gov software. For example, “in May 2011, CMS documented a testing 
framework that was to establish a consistent, repeatable CMS testing life-cycle process for 
business application and infrastructure testing.”182 In the contract document CMS required 
its contractors to use the testing framework to conduct testing and validate all the software 
releases for FMS and DHS systems prior to implementation.183 The contract included 
“integration and end-to-end testing of both the FFM and DSH systems.”184 The testing 
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process for different modules that allowed the FFM and other system to operate together 
did not happen.185 The GAO report also indicated that if the testing for the HealthCare.gov 
website happened, it would have shown whether the “individual systems that support the 
federally facilitated marketplace work [ed] together as intended.” 186 CMS and OMB 
would have found out that the HealthCare.gov website did not work as intended sooner and 
would have had opportunities to fix the website before it launched if they had followed 
normal a business process change.  
According to the GAO report, CMS did not execute all the required testing for 
systems supporting HealthCare.gov as the agency was supposed to.187 For example, just 
two months before the system opened for public use in August 2013, the contract team and 
CMS did not complete the “integration testing with plan issuers that was expected to 
connect to the DSH to send health plan information to the FFM plan management 
module.”188 In addition, the pending defects were not fixed properly for the FFM system 
eligibility and the enrollment module to function correctly.189 The testing process is very 
important in business process change management because testing an IT system is essential 
to help system developers and users validate if the system meets the requirements for its 
intended use and satisfies the users’ need. Effective testing can help identify and correct 
software and system errors early and that ensures assessment of system readiness in time. 
The testing process is used to evaluate whether the program is ready to move from the 
Obtain phase to the Operation and Maintenance phase. IEEE developed best practices 
which recommended program offices to conduct systems testing as early and as often in 
the life cycle of an acquisition software development project.190 The timely and frequent 
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reducing the chance for overall project and schedule failures. For most DHS and DOD 
acquisition life cycles, testing happens under the Obtain phase before moving to the 
transition the software to the Operation and Maintenance phase. For IT development 
projects under CMS, testing usually happens in the Development and Implementation 
phase, the third phase before the Operation and Maintenance phase in the IT Enterprise 
Life Cycle.191 The GAO report further said that the “end-to-end testing of HealthCare.gov 
and its supporting systems did not occur prior to system launch as required. CMS did not 
always ensure that system defects found during the testing were corrected prior to system 
launch.”192 Testing is one the most crucial process in the Development and 
Implementation phase, and it plays a major role in business process change. Without 
completing the testing process, the program would not be able the detect errors, 
deficiencies; the system also failed to get the users and stakeholders buy-in with the new 
system.  
As evidenced by the systems’ failures when launched, many defective system 
components and errors were carried out into production, causing the website to fail. Two 
major failures were that the website could not handle the volume of the enrollment 
requested and often crashed, and that the technical aspects such as its assurance system 
were not functioning. The website could not process and produce accurate insurance rates 
using the identity and eligibility information. If the HealthCare.gov program went through 
the testing process properly, CMS would have been able to detect the problems, which 
would have been fixed in time. The testing process would have given all the stakeholders—
in this case, the OMB, HHS and CMS leadership—opportunities to fix the website, and 
they may have decided to delay the launch in October 2013 until they could make sure the 
website ran smoothly. 
E. CONCLUSION 
The HealthCare.gov project has made significant improvements since its launch. 
The second enrollment which began on November 15, 2014 ran smoothly, and there were 
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no outages. The HHS OIG noted that the response time when applicants clicked on the 
HealthCare.gov website was much faster, running at 3.1 seconds compared to 18.46 
seconds during the first launch in October 2013.193 CMS also tried to fix the technical 
errors with health care plans’ costs and tax credits in addition to strengthening the 
leadership and providing more oversight on the HealthCare.gov project.194 As of June 
2015, over 9.9 million Americans completed their health care plan on the HealthCare.gov 
website.195 Despite these improvements, the initial failure resulted in widespread negative 
publicity for the website. The initial launch failure overshadowed the objective of the ACA, 
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V. FBI VIRTUAL CASE FILE 
Chapter V focuses on the fourth case study, the FBI VCF. It provides the lessons 
learned, and describes the challenges faced by the VCF project. The FBI’s information 
technology system in the 2000s was antiquated and lacked data sharing capability. By the 
early 2000s, the FBI IT systems that supported the agency’s practices of collecting, sharing, 
and accessing investigation data were very outdated and barely functioned.196 FBI agents 
collected information through their work with local law enforcement, surveillance, and 
interviews.197 They then would process paperwork by filling out a paper form, faxing or 
sending the investigation data via FedEx up their chain of command, either to the 
supervisor or special agent in charge to accept the information and log it into an FBI system 
to officially document the data.198 The FBI could not effectively preserve or share the 
investigation information among field offices or internally with FBI agents.199 Essentially, 
the FBI could not efficiently access information related to terrorism, criminal cases, or 
share investigation information agency wide. The FBI’s inadequate IT system attracted 
headlines in the news. Under these circumstances, the VCF project was designed to help 
the FBI achieve greater data sharing and better support for FBI investigative missions.  
In September 2000, the FBI received $379.8 million for a three-year project to 
upgrade the FBI’s technology system.200 The upgrade of the IT efforts—named Trilogy— 
included three parts. The first part upgraded FBI computers, desktops, scanners, printers 
and servers. The second part upgraded and secured local-area and wide-area networks. The 
first two parts, upgrading hardware and networks, were to support the automated case 
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support system (ACS) to run more efficiently. The VCF was the last effort in the Trilogy 
project and is the focus of this chapter. The VCF was designed to retain investigation data 
as virtual case files to replace the old, paper-based system with the ACS.201 The ACS 
system202 was one of the top five applications used within the FBI. The other four were 
IntelPlus, the Criminal Law Enforcement Application, the Integrated Intelligence 
Information Application, and the Telephone application, all accessible via Internet.203 
These five investigation applications were also referred to as User Applications 
Components (UAC).204 While they were all accessible online, the main problem with the 
system was that each of the five applications were not connected to each other. The VCF 
system was meant to integrate them all into one web-based system. 
The VCF was intended to help FBI agents share data to process active investigation 
cases more efficiently. The VCF system was designed by Science Applications 
International Corp (SAIC) under the FBI’s oversight. The contract was awarded to SAIC 
in June 2001 and the VCF originally was supposed to be completed by mid-2004.205 Then, 
September 11 occurred causing Congress to realize the urgency to upgrade the FBI 
information sharing system. The FBI received additional funding to upgrade the VCF 
project.206 However, four years into the project, after spending over $170 million, a lack 
of clear requirements and scope for the project, a lack of leadership and expertise, as well 
as insufficient business process change led to the cancellation of the VCF project with 
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SAIC in April 2005.207 Subsequently, the FBI continued its efforts to obtain an automatic 
electronic investigation system with different vendors and changed the project name to 
“Sentinel” in May 2005.  
This chapter reviews how the VCF project defined project requirements and 
exercised leadership, expertise, and business process change throughout the Acquisition 
Life cycle. Finally, the case study ends with what went wrong with the VCF and what has 
become of Sentinel after the VCF project was terminated.  
A. PROJECT REQUIREMENTS AND SCOPE 
The FBI made many missteps in establishing project requirements and scope. First, 
it lacked an enterprise architecture that described how VCF would support the FBI 
operational mission. As a result, the project started with vague project needs that did not 
capture all the system needs. However, later in the Acquisition Life cycle, more detailed 
project requirements emerged. All these issues in project requirements and scope increased 
the complexity of the project and resulted in an unsuccessful project.  
1. Underestimated Requirements 
FBI system control and information access should have been key requirements for 
the VCF project. One of the FBI’s needs from the VCF system was to balance between 
system control to meet security and legal requirements against having information 
accessible for its operations. The FBI agency collects a vast amount of information, and 
FBI agents need to access that data for their investigations and other operational missions. 
However, privacy laws such as Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
(HIPAA) and the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act commonly restrict access to 
that information, which can be extremely important for FBI agents. Therefore, the 
information that FBI agents enter into the agency system must be secure but still accessible 
for the agents. If the VCF system makes information inaccessible to agents then agents 
may not enter or share important information at all. Instead, “agents or other information 
collectors may be inclined to keep two sets of records—one for official use and one for 
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more sensitive information—allowing them to maintain control over the disposition of 
sensitive information.” 208 This way, FBI agents would ensure they could still access such 
data in a timely way. However, their old paper-based system used hundreds of forms and 
required more than 20,000 access controls to conduct the agency’s business209 The VCF 
system needed to simplify the amount of forms used and needed to keep data secure but 
still accessible to certified personnel. One of the main struggles in the development of the 
VCF system was to ensure it met these operational, security, and accessibility goals at the 
same time. Identifying these specific needs at the beginning of the project was necessary 
to be able to design an IT system that met the security requirements and gave FBI agents 
both needed access and system control. However, the process of identifying VCF security 
and operational requirements did not happen. 
The project experienced an increase in scope about six months after the project 
started in June. The FBI signed the contract to begin upgrading the Trilogy project in mid-
2001; then the September 11 attack and the Hanssen espionage happened.210 These two 
events exposed the weaknesses of the FBI electronic case file system, so the FBI added 
additional requirements to the VCF part of the Trilogy project. According to the OIG report 
on the Trilogy IT modernization project, after September 2011 the project scope increased 
by 80 percent.211 The additional requirements included shortening the project duration to 
less than three years. After the September 11 events, the FBI mission included “terrorist 
investigations” in addition to criminal investigations. Moreover, the new requirements 
would be to replace the entire ACS with the new VCF system instead of just upgrading the 
old ACS by turning the old paper file to a webpage search.212 The additional changes, both 
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in scope and schedule, complicated the VCF project, which already lacked well-defined 
requirements.  
The FBI did not have clear and locked requirements in the first stage of the 
acquisition process, the Need phase, in mid- and late 2000 when the agency began the 
project.213 According to the 2005 congressional testimony of FBI director Robert Mueller, 
the FBI had not come up with completed requirements for the VCF when the agency 
entered the Obtain phase in June 2001.214 The FBI had a general idea that it needed to 
upgrade its electronic case management system, which supported the agency with its 
investigation mission, but it failed to define the specific requirements needed. The original 
requirements the FBI defined were to upgrade the UAC from the outdated 1980s 
technology to an easy click-and-search capability so FBI agents could access investigation 
information more efficiently in the FBI investigation database.215 However, the 
requirements did not include the details of how the upgrading would work with the FBI’s 
current and future software and hardware. This vague requirement was documented in the 
Department of Justice OIG report. The report explained that the VCF project requirement 
were not based on thorough planning that included the agency’s operational needs but 
rather was what some FBI IT managers’ assumed would be beneficial for the agents to do 
their daily jobs.216 As a result, the VCF project had deficiencies later in the Acquisition 
Life cycle. Long after the VCF program started, and as of 2004, the FBI could not make 
“comprehensive and consistent operational or technical decisions on how to link the FBI 
database of investigative information.”217 The FBI did not have the data sharing policies 
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and methods that would guide the agency to make trade-off decisions between security and 
information access in the creation of their investigation information system.218  
The FBI failed to understand the complexity of the project, which stemmed from 
not fully defining the project requirements, and this put the VCF project at risk of failing 
to meet the cost and delivery schedule. Before Congress in 2005, FBI director Robert 
Mueller also confirmed that the agency did not capture all the complexity of the system 
migration, integration, or document all the security and operational needs in VCF. The 
underestimation of the project requirements further showed the fact that the FBI did not 
fully capture all IT inventory that needed to be migrated and integrated from the old system 
to the VCF. The underestimation of the inventory system caused delays in schedule. For 
example, the IT project manager said that the FBI failed to estimate how network traffic 
would be slowed “once all 22,000 users came online.”219 Subsequently, when the VCF 
began testing the system in December 2003, there were many system failures, and the FBI 
decided to reject the delivery.  
2. Enterprise Architecture  
The agency’s needs should have been captured and well defined in the initial project 
requirements. Figure 7 depicts the FBI organization, business activities, and strategic goals. 
This information should have been used to help develop the enterprise architecture 
document.  
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Figure 7. FBI Organization and Activities.220 
The FBI entered the first acquisition phase for the Trilogy project without an 
enterprise architecture.221 An enterprise architecture is similar to a CONOPS, as the 
process to come up with the enterprise architecture occurs in the first phase of the 
Acquisition Life cycle, the Need phase. A new project should begin with a business case 
study that documents the agency’s current operational needs, compares the current system 
available versus the agency’s needed system, and evaluates how the new system would 
help the agency. In sum, an enterprise architecture is a process that maps the organization, 
the current state of its IT infrastructure, and the IT infrastructure’s future state with well-
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defined project goals and objectives.222 For the VCF, the FBI should have had a process 
map that described how the VCF would help FBI operational missions such as criminal 
identification, criminal investigation, criminal apprehension and prosecution support. The 
process map would have also described the migration process from the FBI’s current 
system, ACS, to the VCF system and how the VCF would add value to Intelligence and 
Counterintelligence missions. Finally, the enterprise architecture also should have planned 
how the VCF connected to the FBI’s other infrastructure such as Research and Laboratory 
and how VCF would contribute to the law enforcement training programs. Figure 8 shows 
the process map that National Academies attempted to design to help the FBI start the 
enterprise architecture process.  
 
Figure 8. FBI Process Map for VCF.223 
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Without an enterprise architecture, the FBI could not come up with a meaningful 
measure of progress on the project. The GAO issued a report that specifically called for the 
FBI to come up with an enterprise architecture for the project and the National Academies 
had issued warnings to the FBI on the risks of continuing the Trilogy project without an 
enterprise architecture.224 Both reports also found that the FBI needed—and should 
actually have had—an enterprise architecture in place for the VCF to be implemented 
successfully. However, in 2002, over a year after VCF was in development, the FBI still 
did not have an “enterprise architecture and did not have all the written policies and 
processes in place to develop one.”225 The FBI began the VCF project in 2000 but Mueller 
testified that it did not begin to develop the enterprise architecture until 2004.226 After the 
FBI ended the contract with SAIC in 2005, the FBI had to remap the IT process backward 
by using the agency’s current technology and future needs to come up with a gap analysis 
and an enterprise architecture document. The Trilogy project resulted in many technical 
issues that ultimately caused cost increases and schedule delays. 
If VCF had an enterprise architecture document, the agency would have had a clear 
process map. The enterprise architecture would explain how the VCF supported FBI 
missions and met operational, security, and user objectives. However, the FBI did not 
establish clear requirements for the VCF project and failed to complete the enterprise 
architecture in the Need phase. As a result, the VCF requirements kept changing as the 
project progressed. The acquisition process is a progressive process and the agency did not 
lock down or reset when project changes occurred, which had detrimental effects on cost 
and schedule because no project cost and schedule baseline existed for the contractors and 
project team to follow. Therefore, there was no preventive, performance measurement to 
use. The result was that the FBI management could not make sound decisions regarding 
balance between technical and operational requirements. Without the enterprise 
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architecture, the FBI essentially failed to capture what and how the VCF would help agents 
to perform day-to-day operations.  
B. LEADERSHIP AND EXPERTISE  
Strong leadership and the right expertise play a crucial role in IT projects’ success. 
Like previous case studies, the VCF project suffered greatly from the high turnover in many 
positions that supported the project: the VCF went through 15 different key IT managers 
and five chief of information officers, or acting chief of information officers from 2000 – 
2005.227 With high turnover in key positions, the program lost its continuity and program 
experience, which resulted in a lack of effective program management.  
In addition to the high turnover rate, the leadership’s support for the project was 
also weak. For example, according to the Justice Department OIG report, the IT project 
managers did not follow policies and procedures for IT project management, and FBI did 
not follow an IT investment framework.228 Table 4 presents five critical processes of the 
Basic IT Investment Management Framework that the FBI should have implemented by 
2002, but for reasons unspecified in the OIG report, the FBI struggled to implement the 
five critical processes to apply the Information Technology Investment Management 
(ITIM)229 framework required by the GAO. In addition, the Department of Justice OIG 
reported that procedures for IT management were not well written for the FBI employees 
to follow.230 This is another example of the FBI falling short of developing and 
implementing a complete IT investment management framework and the critical processes 
that go along with that framework. 
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Table 4. Five Critical Processes of the Basic IT Investment Management 
Framework231 
Critical Processes FBI Status of Implementing  
Critical Process 
Defining investment review board 
operations Not implemented  
Developing a basic process for selecting 
new IT proposals Partially implemented 
Developing project-level investment 
control processes Not implemented 
Identifying IT projects and systems Not implemented 
Identifying the business needs for each IT 
project Not implemented 
 
The lack of strong leadership in the VCF project was the result of the FBI not fully 
following the ITIM framework,232 resulting in bad decisions being made for the project. 
For example, not following the framework affected the type of contract taken. Since the 
FBI did not fully understand the project requirements, the agency leadership decided to use 
the cost-plus-award-fee type of contract. This type of contract is usually used in research 
with unknown requirements or preliminary exploration per Federal Acquisition Regulation 
(FAR) Law, part 16.306.233 A cost-plus-award-fee contract was bad for Trilogy for various 
reasons. First, in a cost-plus-award-fee contract, contractors are not required to complete 
specific milestones, which are critical decision review points. Consequently, there were no 
penalties or incentives for the contractor to meet the cost and schedule requirements. 
Second, the contractor that supported Trilogy, SAIC, was only required put in their best 
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effort for the project.234 Third, if the FBI would not reimburse the cost, the contractor 
could stop work with no penalties. Consequently, the cost-plus-award-fee procurement 
vehicle was a much riskier contract choice compared to other contract vehicles.  
Weak leadership resulted in the project missing progress reviews, which put the 
project at an even higher risk for failure. Progress reviews are one of the management tools 
that helps management to keep the project on the right course and allow for intervention 
before it is too late. Since the VCF project started in 2000, the FBI did not have an 
acquisition framework with milestones or progress reviews before the point when FBI 
received the first delivery from SAIC in December 2003, which was when the FBI began 
to see issues with VCF.235 The lack of strong leadership through developing and following 
the IT management framework, high turnover in many key positions and lack of expertise 
in software engineering and procurement were other contributing factors of the VCF 
failure.  
C. BUSINESS PROCESS CHANGE 
FBI modernization efforts involved in organizational and technological changes 
required an agency-wide buy-in process. Not enough users had vetted prototypes to win 
this degree of acceptance. User testing and vetting processes would have increased the 
likelihood of system success. Having real users testing the system would have helped IT 
contractors catch system errors and receive timely feedback; involvement from users would 
have greatly benefitted the project.  
The FBI was involved in bringing the VCF online, but the agency did not vet the 
process that would be required to train thousands of its employees, agents, and analysts to 
use the VCF system. Furthermore, if the agency had had an enterprise architecture, it would 
have helped the FBI to articulate all the agency’s needs for the VCF. The enterprise 
architecture would have helped the agency through the process map and gap analysis to 
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balance between the technical and security issues, such as how to meet the FBI’s usage of 
form and control access and migrating data from ACS to VCF.  
The FBI should have implemented a key component of business process change 
from the beginning of the project: user input. Users of the system should have been 
consulted when defining the system’s requirements instead of relying only on IT managers’ 
attempts to define the needs. An enterprise architecture and strong business process change 
would bring FBI employees and all stakeholders together for the modernization effort of 
transitioning from ACS to VCF.  
In addition to the lack of user involvement, it appeared that there was not enough 
coordination among different stakeholders in the VCF project, such as coordination among 
the IT, finance, and contracting divisions supporting the Trilogy projects.236 The defined 
requirements were disconnected from the actual user needs. The contract choice was not a 
well-thought-out process. If there had been better coordination, the requirements would 
have been better defined which would have also allowed for a contract type that lowered 
the government’s risk. If the project had implemented strong business process change from 
the beginning, the communication and collaboration needed to find a solution would have 
been more effective. Since the FBI did not have strong business process change, the agency 
failed to implement VCF. 
D. CONCLUSION 
The VCF project provides many lessons learned. In short, the FBI’s weak project 
management, failure to define the Trilogy project requirements, weak leadership, lack of 
expertise, and weak business process change contributed to cost and schedule overruns and 
the FBI spent over $170 million without results. The VCF project with SAIC was 
cancelled. The FBI director at the time, Robert Mueller, faced multiple congressional 
hearings about VCF. The project spent hundreds of millions of dollars and endured much 
scrutiny from Congress for these cost and schedule overruns. The initial failure of VCF 
can be traced back to the problems from the beginning of the acquisition phase. Throughout 
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the development period from 2001 to 2005, the FBI struggled to develop an enterprise 
architecture that tied the project to the agency’s operational objectives. The enterprise 
architecture, which should have happened in the Need phase in the Acquisition Life cycle, 
did not happen until 2005. The VCF project’s operational requirements and objectives were 
not well defined and the requirements kept changing after the project had started. In 
addition, with the weak business process change, poor leadership, and lack of expertise, 
the VCF project was doomed to fail in the first attempt with SAIC. Despite the initial failure 
and the decade spent on it, the VCF project with the name changed to Sentinel continued 
to completion in 2011. 
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VI. CONCLUSION  
Large government IT projects are often categorized as high-risk and likely to fail. 
They are complex and take longer than two years to develop. Government IT projects are 
usually built to connect to multiple agencies. These projects affect a wide range of 
agencies’ operational missions and the different types of services that these agencies 
provide to the public. The four government IT projects this thesis analyzed—DHS TRIO, 
USCG IHiS, HealthCare.gov, and FBI VCF—are categorized as large projects.237 The 
challenges in the cases reviewed in this thesis are not unique. The initial failures and 
missteps that emerged in the case studies are not isolated cases: these issues have happened 
to other government projects as well. The case studies and lessons learned in this thesis 
may contribute to more effective practices in future large government IT projects. This 
chapter first presents the findings of why large IT projects fail. Second, it provides 
recommendations to the USCG and to large IT government acquisition projects on 
avoiding common mistakes and successfully implementing these projects. Third, it gives 
recommendations for further research to learn more from previous large IT project failures 
in both the government and the private sector.  
A. FINDINGS 
The projects explored in the four case studies all experienced schedule delays and 
cost increases. The DHS TRIO and HealthCare.gov projects required significant rework 
while IHiS and FBI VCF were cancelled and restarted as new projects. The DHS TRIO 
project costs increased by 54 percent from the original estimate and delayed the scheduled 
delivery by more than two years.238 The USCG IHiS spent over $56 million, and after five 
years, it was cancelled and restarted as a completely new project named DOD MHS 
GENESIS.239 The HealthCare.gov cost increased from the original estimate of $292 
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million to $2.1 billion.240 The FBI wasted $105 million by the time the project was 
cancelled and restarted as a new project in 2005.241 A summary of the money and time 
invested in the case studies’ IT projects is provided in Table 5. 














Two Years Five Years  Three Years  Five Years  
Estimated cost $79.2 million  $14 million $292 million $378 million  
End cost $122 million $56 million $2.1 billion  $170 million 
Unusable/ 
Waste Cost  N/A $56 million N/A $105 million 
Cost increase 
percentage 54% 300% 619% N/A 
Result of 
project Reworked Restarted Reworked Restarted 
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This thesis identifies four common causes for the failure of the four case studies’ 
large federal IT projects. First, the projects were likely to fail when they did not define the 
project outcomes and/or failed to define how the outcomes would support the 
organizations’ missions. Second, the projects often failed because they did not have the 
right expertise in engineering, project management, and procurement. Third, they lacked 
leadership support through business process change. Lastly, leadership’s weak 
commitment to following the acquisition’s progress and milestone review procedures 
resulted in project delays and increased costs. 
1. Defining Project Outcomes at The Beginning 
One reason the case studies’ IT projects failed is the agencies’ inability to complete 
the first and the most crucial step in the acquisition process: defining the project 
requirements. In the first case study, the DHS TRIO project, it was a year after the project 
transitioned to the Obtain phase (the third phase in the Acquisition Life cycle process) 
when DHS determined that it had not identified all of the requirements in the first two 
acquisition phases, the Need and Analyze/Select Phases. DHS did not fully capture how 
the new financial management system would interface with its other systems such as 
human resource and procurement systems.246 In addition, DHS did not develop the concept 
of operations (CONOPS) document for the project.247 The CONOPS document lays out 
how the new financial system would support the DHS mission. It also details how the new 
financial system would help the agency to report their financial transactions that support 
DHS’s multiple strategic missions and comply with all of the government updated cyber 
security requirements. DHS TRIO should have had the CONOPS for the new financial 
system in the first acquisition phase, the Need phase. Missing the CONOPS caused the 
project to incur cost increases and schedule delays.  
The second and third cases, USCG IHiS and the HealthCare.gov also did not 
identify all the systems’ needs in the Need phase. Without identifying all the system 
requirements in this phase, the USCG could not validate alignment between the project 
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requirements with the USCG’s health care system’s operational missions. Similarly, the 
Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) could not lockdown the project 
requirements and scope for the HealthCare.gov website before moving into the 
Development and Implementation phase. This delay was due to conflicting interpretations 
and debates about policy around the ACA.248 While the HealthCare.gov requirements and 
scope were outside of the hands of the software developers, the project still suffered from 
the failure to establish a clear goal and requirements in the initial phases. 
Finally, in the fourth case study, the FBI VCF, the FBI also did not lock down the 
agency’s requirements for the project in the first phase of the acquisition process. There 
were no well-defined requirements or CONOPS, explaining how the VCF would support 
FBI missions or meet operational, security, and users’ objectives.249 In other words, the 
FBI failed to capture what and how the VCF would help the agency’s agents to perform 
their daily work. In each of these cases, the failure to define the project’s requirements 
caused schedule delays and, therefore, cost increases. 
All four case studies demonstrate the importance of defining requirements at the 
beginning of the acquisition process. Without defining the project requirements, projects 
are destined to fail because they lack well-defined goals, clarity on how they will add value 
to the organization’s business, and certainty as to whether the organization needs the 
projects in the first place. In addition, when the projects’ requirements are not defined early 
in the first acquisition phase, there is very high possibility that it will result in cost increase 
and schedule delayed as evidenced by the case studies.  
2. Right Expertise  
Another reason why the projects associated with the four case studies failed was a 
lack of the right expertise to support the projects. Some projects were unable to fill all the 
required vacancies to support the projects. In the DHS TRIO project, the support team, 
DOI-IBC, did not have the right expertise in engineering and information technology, 
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especially for the Oracle version 12.2 that DHS chose as the main software for the new 
financial management system. The HealthCare.gov contract support team MarkLogic also 
lacked expertise in using a nontraditional SQL platform. In both case studies, the 
government decided to use a newer version of the Oracle software and nontraditional SQL 
platform250 instead of the older version of Oracle and the traditional SQL platform. The 
current staff would have needed experience in these newer versions to meet the project 
requirements. The lack of expertise with newer technology caused issues for the projects. 
This error reinforces guidance to not modify COTS products because in doing so, the seller 
must deviate from their core competency, potentially causing maintenance problems.251 
Specifically, in the TRIO and the HealthCare.gov cases, the IT specialists were not familiar 
with the new requested versions and were unable to fulfill their deliverables. 
The lack of expertise was exacerbated by high rates of staff turnover in these 
projects as it reduced the expertise needed for their successful completion. The TRIO 
project experienced high staff turnover and could not fill all the required job vacancies. 
Unfortunately, the lack of required expertise eventually resulted in DHS cancelling the 
project with DOI-IBC in 2017. IHiS suffered from change in management staff,252 which 
contributed to the project’s failures. The project lost leadership champions, mentors, and 
project knowledge through the turnover. As a result, the loss of leaders negatively impacted 
the support staff’s morale. In the HealthCare.gov project, there was a significant turnover 
rate of key leadership positions. The high turnover rate affected the productivity in the 
project because staff were overworked and stressed out.253 Consequently, the support level 
for the project was negatively affected. Furthermore, the high turnover rate reduced the 
organizational knowledge and relationships among staff that was much needed for the 
HealthCare.gov project’s success. Similarly, in the FBI VCF case study, the program 
experienced high turnover in key positions. VCF went through so much turnover in key 
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positions that the program lost its continuity, program experience, and corporate 
knowledge.254  
Expertise is essential to project development but technology advances and turnover 
can derail an IT acquisition project. Because government acquisition projects take a long 
time to develop, by the time the project is nearing completion, technology will have likely 
advanced. This may tempt the program office to implement the newer technology in the 
current acquisition project. However, this can cause problems with implementation 
because there are not enough IT specialists or engineers familiar with the newer 
technology. Consequently, the program office may have a hard time filling the positions to 
modify the technology to meet the project’s needs. Moreover, having the right expertise 
and a stable team with a low turnover rate is an asset for any project. Turnover results in a 
loss of knowledge, continuity, and morale while the stress level for the remaining team 
members increases. Moreover, for new hires, the learning curve is sharper the later they 
join the project.255 Therefore, it is likely turnover will escalate in environments where 
there is limited support and a lack of expertise.256 In sum, high turnover has detrimental 
effects on team productivity. 
3. Leadership Through Business Process Change 
Another contributing factor to IT project failure was the lack of leadership support 
through business process change. Leadership is supposed to provide strong support for the 
project through changing communication, developing training programs, creating a user 
manual, and helping employees buy in to the new IT system. In the DHS TRIO project, 
DHS had failed to prepare for change management by not involving all the stakeholders in 
the buy-in process and not helping the stakeholders understand how the new system would 
operate.257 In the USCG IHiS project, the USCG did not execute business process change. 
For instance, there was not enough training developed for the USCG or State Department 
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health care workforce to get ready for the roll-out of IHiS.258 In addition, the USCG did 
not develop a user manual that would help the users gain familiarity with the new health 
care system. Training and the user manual creation should have been taking place before 
the project was cancelled because, by this time, the IHiS project was already in the Obtain 
phase, the third acquisition phase. In this phase, the business process change should have 
been executed. However, due to the project’s issues with undefined requirements, late 
attempts at establishing them could be a reason appropriate business process change was 
also delayed. The FBI VCF also experienced insufficient support in the user testing and 
vetting process. The FBI did not invest in getting the users familiar with the new VCF 
system, did not help the users learn how to use the system, and did not seek the users’ buy-
in.  
Change is a challenge. Business process change helps an organization successfully 
transition to a new IT system. Without effective business process change an IT project will 
not be able to add value to the organization because employees are more likely to resist the 
transition and see little value added to their day-to-day operations. Regarding increasing 
costs and schedule delays, business process change is also designed with the user in mind. 
Without the users’ participation in the testing process, the program may not be able to 
detect system errors or whether the system works as designed for the user. Consequently, 
the project could be cancelled due to it not meeting users’ needs. 
4. Leadership Through Internal Control Procedures 
Leadership plays an important role to track the acquisition progress and milestone 
review procedures. However, as this thesis finds, faulty leadership was another reason for 
the failure of the IT projects. Indeed, in the IHiS project, the Coast Guard did not follow 
all the required steps in the System Development Life Cycle (SDLC) project management 
practice.259 The process includes acquisition decision events (ADE) and milestone review 
procedures. Skipping these key procedures allowed the project to move forward before it 
was ready to do so, which can result in project failure at a later stage of the acquisition 
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process. In the HealthCare.gov project, CMS management did not apply management tools 
such as progress reviews throughout the Acquisition Life cycle to monitor the project’s 
progress, which protects the project from failures. In sum, management in both the IHiS 
and the HealthCare.gov projects did not provide oversight over their projects to the extent 
that they were supposed to.260 The progress reviews are designed to keep the project on 
the right track for development purposes. Lacking leadership support through the progress 
review can cause negative consequences for the acquisition projects. Progress review is a 
management tool and is also an internal control and risk management tool. Without using 
the progress review properly, leadership would lose the visibility on the true progress of 
the project. In addition, leadership would not be able to assess whether the project’s current 
progress would lead it to meet the designed requirements, cost and schedule. In sum, 
without the proper progress review, leadership would not able to do any risk mitigations to 
save the project from failing until it is too late.  
The four large government IT projects, DHS TRIO, USCG IHiS, HealthCare.gov, 
and FBI VCF, shared similar results. They all experienced significant schedule delays and 
cost increases, which inevitably led them to fail. The major factors that contributed to the 
four projects’ failures were not defining the project outcomes at the beginning of the 
Acquisition Life cycle, the lack of right expertise, and weak leadership through the business 
process change and the internal control procedures. The projects’ challenges and 
shortcomings led to lessons learned in these four areas for future government and private 
sector large IT projects.  
B. RECOMMENDATIONS  
In line with the findings, this thesis provides the USCG with recommendations on 
how to meet IT projects’ cost estimates and schedules, increase the likelihood of procuring 
a system that will meet its financial and operational needs, and acquire the value that the 
agency has paid for. The recommendations provided are applicable to any large IT 
acquisition project. The four case studies that this thesis reviews boil down to a few 
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important elements that contribute to successful projects, especially government IT 
projects. These elements are defining the project outcomes at the beginning, having the 
right expertise, leading the organization through business process change, and fostering 
internal control procedures.  
1. Defining Project Outcomes at the Beginning 
Before an organization starts with any acquisition project, it should put together a 
case study to identify the organization’s operational needs, and figure out whether their 
current system capabilities meet their needs or whether gaps exist. The findings of this case 
study will help develop a CONOPS and determine how the new information system would 
add value to the organization and how it would help the organization to carry out its 
operational missions or conduct its daily business.  
Essentially, an organization should put together the CONOPS document in the first 
phase of the acquisition process. The CONOPS is not only important for the daily business 
but it is also a business management tool. It helps organizations with strategic and 
operational plans. Through the CONOPS, the organization then defines the scope and the 
project requirements in the Need phase. 
In addition, government agencies should complete the AoA study and the market 
research in the Analyze/Select Phase, the second phase of the Acquisition Life cycle 
process. It is crucial that IT projects of the USCG, or the government in general, stay within 
the project scope and follow the details of the work breakdown structure.  
2. Right Expertise  
Leadership should commit their full support to the acquisition project by investing 
in human resources, such as by hiring and retaining in-house staff with all the required 
expertise in the areas of engineering, project management, financial management, and 
procurement. In addition to these areas, some projects may also require expertise in law 
and policy. When a project is fully staffed with all required skills and expertise, the 
workload can be evenly distributed and it is less stressful for the staff. The working 
environment for the staff is less complicated. In this condition, the team is considered to 
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be mature and the result is that the team will be more likely to work together successfully 
to support the project.  
In addition, the government should be very careful when choosing a new 
technology or newer versions of current software. The government should verify the 
technology is widely available and that there is sufficient expertise in the field to fulfill the 
deliverables. 
3. Leadership Through Business Process Change 
For a project to get implemented successfully, agencies need strong support from 
senior management and active participation from both senior management and all the 
stakeholders. Program management officials, stakeholders and the project support staff 
must maintain a strong communication channel with each other.  
Leadership should foster a partnership environment among all employees whose 
jobs are affected by the new system, and should have those employees involved with the 
program throughout the whole life cycle acquisition process. Employees who will be users 
of the new system should participate in defining the requirements, conducting the gap 
analysis, developing a case study process for the project requirements, decision making, 
testing and training. By providing this type of support, the leadership helps users and 
organizations come together as “one team” to transition smoothly to the new system. 
Moreover, users’ participation plays a crucial role in a project’s success. Especially, the 
participation of end users in testing a system’s functionality and general testing before 
transitioning the system to the Operation and Maintenance phase is extremely important 
for the IT project. It adds value to the end users, which in turn adds value to the 
organization’s business.  
4. Leadership Through Internal Control Procedures 
Lastly, leadership support must also be reflected in commitment to following the 
progress and milestone reviews. These types of reviews are set up as a management tool or 
sometimes as an internal control process to mitigate risks in acquisition projects. The 
reviews are intended for the leadership to review and monitor project progress and to 
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intervene if necessary to prevent cost increases, schedule delays, or ultimately project 
failures. It is imperative that leadership fully commits to participating in progress reviews 
as they are intended.  
In summary, if the United States Coast Guard has well-defined project requirements 
established early in the Acquisition Life cycle; qualified staff; strong engagement from 
management, stakeholders, and end users; and executes timely progress reviews, the 
United States Coast Guard will meet the cost and schedule of an IT acquisition, but more 
importantly, the agency will be able to implement a successful IT system. Furthermore, the 
new system will meet USCG financial and operational needs. IT acquisition projects that 
follow the necessary steps in defining requirements, hiring and retaining qualified staff, 
having strong management and stakeholder engagement, having a strong business change 
process, and committing to following progress reviews could save the USCG millions of 
dollars and years of unsuccessful efforts.  
C. FUTURE RESEARCH 
The findings from the four case studies are derived from a small sample size which 
only included recent IT projects in the United States—which represents a limitation of this 
thesis.261 Future research could expand on the reasons for failures of other countries’ 
government IT and private IT projects. Future research can also focus on the lessons 
learned from the failures to benefit both public and private IT development projects. 
  
 
261 Another limitation to this study was not having access to all For-Official-Use-Only and sensitive 
documentation that might provide insight as to why such decisions in the IT acquisition projects were 
made. Use of open source material did not reveal insights into why leadership did not perform specific 
tasks. 
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